AN OVERVIEW OF THE UN CONVENTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS CONCERNING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION

Vienna, February 2004
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1  DEFINITIONS - FINANCIAL

1.1.1  FATF 40 Recommendations

Interpretative notes

General

1. Reference in this document to “countries” should be taken to apply equally to “territories” or “jurisdictions”.

2. Recommendations 5-16 and 21-22 state that financial institutions or designated non-financial businesses and professions should take certain actions. These references require countries to take measures that will oblige financial institutions or designated non-financial businesses and professions to comply with each Recommendation. The basic obligations under Recommendations 5, 10 and 13 should be set out in law or regulation, while more detailed elements in those Recommendations, as well as obligations under other Recommendations, could be required either by law or regulation or by other enforceable means issued by a competent authority.

3. Where reference is made to a financial institution being satisfied as to a matter, that institution must be able to justify its assessment to competent authorities.

4. To comply with Recommendations 12 and 16, countries do not need to issue laws or regulations that relate exclusively to lawyers, notaries, accountants and the other designated non-financial businesses and professions so long as these businesses or professions are included in laws or regulations covering the underlying activities.

5. The Interpretative Notes that apply to financial institutions are also relevant to designated non-financial businesses and professions, where applicable.

The Glossary

“Financial institutions” means any person or entity who conducts as a business one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer:

1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public. (This also captures private banking.)
2. Lending. (This includes inter alia: consumer credit; mortgage credit; factoring, with or without recourse; and finance of commercial transactions (including forfaiting).)
3. Financial leasing. (This does not extend to financial leasing arrangements in relation to consumer products.)
4. The transfer of money or value. (This applies to financial activity in both the formal or informal sector e.g. alternative remittance activity. See the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI. It does not apply to any natural or legal person that provides financial institutions solely with message or other support systems for transmitting funds. See the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII.)
5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, traveller’s cheques, money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money).
6. Financial guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading in:
   (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, derivatives etc.);
   (b) foreign exchange;
   (c) exchange, interest rate and index instruments;
   (d) transferable securities;
   (e) commodity futures trading.
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues.
10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons.
11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons.
12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance. (This applies both to insurance undertakings and to insurance intermediaries (agents and brokers).)

When a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an occasional or very limited basis (having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria) such that there is little risk of money laundering activity occurring, a country may decide that the application of anti-money laundering measures is not necessary, either fully or partially.

In strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk of money laundering, a country may decide not to apply some or all of the Forty Recommendations to some of the financial activities stated above.

“the FATF Recommendations” refers to these Recommendations and to the FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.
Recommendation 12
The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11 apply to designated non-financial businesses and professions in the following situations:
a) Casinos – when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above the applicable designated threshold.
b) Real estate agents - when they are involved in transactions for their client concerning the buying and selling of real estate.
c) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones - when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold.
d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants when they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following activities:
   • buying and selling of real estate;
   • managing of client money, securities or other assets;
   • management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
   • organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies;
   • creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.
e) Trust and company service providers when they prepare for or carry out transactions for a client concerning the activities listed in the definition in the Glossary.

The Glossary
“Designated non-financial businesses and professions” means:
a) Casinos (which also includes internet casinos).
b) Real estate agents.
c) Dealers in precious metals.
d) Dealers in precious stones.
e) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – this refers to sole practitioners, partners or employed professionals within professional firms. It is not meant to refer to ‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other types of businesses, nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may already be subject to measures that would combat money laundering.
f) Trust and Company Service Providers refers to all persons or businesses that are not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations, and which as a business, provide any of the following services to third parties:
   • acting as a formation agent of legal persons;
   • acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons;
   • providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement;
   • acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust;
   • acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person.

“Designated threshold” refers to the amount set out in the Interpretative Notes.

Recommendation 16
The requirements set out in Recommendations 13 to 15, and 21 apply to all designated nonfinancial businesses and professions, subject to the following qualifications:
a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in Recommendation 12(d). Countries are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, including auditing.
b) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be required to report suspicious transactions when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold.
c) Trust and company service providers should be required to report suspicious transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a transaction in relation to the activities referred to Recommendation 12(e).

Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not required to report their suspicions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.

Interpretative note to Recommendations 5, 12 and 16
The designated thresholds for transactions (under Recommendations 5 and 12) are as follows:
• Financial institutions (for occasional customers under Recommendation 5) - USD/EUR 15,000.
• Casinos, including internet casinos (under Recommendation 12) - USD/EUR 3000
• For dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones when engaged in any cash transaction (under Recommendations 12 and 16) - USD/EUR 15,000.

8
Financial transactions above a designated threshold include situations where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked.

**Interpretative note to Recommendation 16**

1. It is for each jurisdiction to determine the matters that would fall under legal professional privilege or professional secrecy. This would normally cover information lawyers, notaries or other independent legal professionals receive from or obtain through one of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration or mediation proceedings. Where accountants are subject to the same obligations of secrecy or privilege, then they are also not required to report suspicious transactions.

2. Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatory organisations, provided that there are appropriate forms of co-operation between these organisations and the FIU.

**Recommendation 20**

Countries should consider applying the FATF Recommendations to businesses and professions, other than designated non-financial businesses and professions, that pose a money laundering or terrorist financing risk.

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**Recommendation 22**

Financial institutions should ensure that the principles applicable to financial institutions, which are mentioned above are also applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws and regulations permit. When local applicable laws and regulations prohibit this implementation, competent authorities in the country of the parent institution should be informed by the financial institutions that they cannot apply the FATF Recommendations.


**Article 12**

Member States shall ensure that the provisions of this Directive are extended in whole or in part to professions and to categories of undertakings, other than the credit and financial institutions referred to in Article 1, which engage in activities which are particularly likely to be used for money-laundering purposes.


**Article 1**

For the purpose of this Directive:

A. "**Credit institution**" means a credit institution, as defined in Article 1(1) first subparagraph of Directive 2000/12/EC and includes branches within the meaning of Article 1(3) of that Directive and located in the Community, of credit institutions having their head offices inside or outside the Community;

B. "**Financial institution**" means:

1. an undertaking other than a credit institution whose principal activity is to carry out one or more of the operations included in numbers 2 to 12 and number 14 of the list set out in Annex I to Directive 2000/12/EC; these include the activities of currency exchange offices ("bureaux de change") and of money transmission/remittance offices;
2. an insurance company duly authorised in accordance with Directive 79/267/EEC, insofar as it carries out activities covered by that Directive;
3. an investment firm as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/22/EEC;
4. a collective investment undertaking marketing its units or shares.

This definition of financial institution includes branches located in the Community of financial institutions, whose head offices are inside or outside the Community,
ANNEX

LIST OF ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION

1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds
2. Lending (1)
3. Financial leasing
4. Money transmission services
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts)
6. Guarantees and commitments
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
   (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, etc.)
   (b) foreign exchange;
   (c) financial futures and options;
   (d) exchange and interest-rate instruments;
   (e) transferable securities
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of services related to such issues
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related questions and advice as well as services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings
10. Money broking
11. Portfolio management and advice
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities
13. Credit reference services
14. Safe custody services

(1) Including, inter alia:
- consumer credit,
- mortgage credit,
- factoring, with or without recourse,
- financing of commercial transactions (including forfeiting).

C. "Money laundering" means the following conduct when committed intentionally:
– the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of his action;
– the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity;
– the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity;
– participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the foregoing indents.

Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of the above-mentioned activities may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

Money laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which generated the property to be laundered were carried out in the territory of another Member State or in that of a third country.

D. "Property" means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interests in such assets.

E. "Criminal activity" means any kind of criminal involvement in the commission of a serious crime.

Serious crimes are, at least:
– any of the offences defined in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention;
– the activities of criminal organisations as defined in Article 1 of Joint Action 98/733/JHA;
– fraud, at least serious, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests;
– corruption;
– an offence which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the penal law of the Member State.

Member States shall before 15 December 2004 amend the definition provided for in this indent in order to bring this definition into line with the definition of serious crime of Joint Action 98/699/JHA. The Council invites the Commission to present before 15 December 2004 a proposal for a Directive amending in that respect this Directive.

Member States may designate any other offence as a criminal activity for the purposes of this Directive.

F. "Competent authorities" means the national authorities empowered by law or regulation to supervise the activity of any of the institutions or persons subject to this Directive.
Article 2a
Member States shall ensure that the obligations laid down in this Directive are imposed on the following institutions:
1. credit institutions as defined in point A of Article 1;
2. financial institutions as defined in point B of Article 1;
and on the following legal or natural persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities:
3. auditors, external accountants and tax advisors;
4. real estate agents;
5. notaries and other independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether:
   (a) by assisting in the planning or execution of transactions for their client concerning the
       (i) buying and selling of real property or business entities;
       (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets;
       (iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
       (iv) organisation of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies;
       (v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies or similar structures;
   (b) or by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate transaction;
6. dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or metals, or works of art, auctioneers, whenever payment
is made in cash, and in an amount of EUR 15 000 or more;
7. casinos.

Directive 2000/12/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions

Article 1
"1. 'Credit institution' shall mean: Directive 2000/12/EC is hereby amended as follows:
1. Article 1, point 1, first subparagraph shall be replaced by the following text:
   (a) an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for
   its own account; or
   (b) an electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
   Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money
   institutions(7)."

1.1.5 Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up,
pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions

Article 1
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3. For the purposes of this Directive:
   (a) "electronic money institution" shall mean an undertaking or any other legal person, other than a credit institution as
   defined in Article 1, point 1, first subparagraph (a) of Directive 2000/12/EC which issues means of payment in the form
   of electronic money;
   (b) "electronic money" shall mean monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is:
   (i) stored on an electronic device;
   (ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued;
   (iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.
2 CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION

2.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 5
Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names.

Financial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures, including identifying and verifying
the identity of their customers, when:
• establishing business relations;
• carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated threshold; or (ii) that are wire transfers in
  the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII;
• there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or
• the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification
data.

The customer due diligence (CDD) measures to be taken are as follows:
a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or
  information (Reliable, independent source documents, data or information will hereafter be referred to as “identification
data”).
b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner such
  that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements
  this should include financial institutions taking reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure
  of the customer.
c) Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout
  the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s
  knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.

Financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d) above, but may determine the
extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business relationship or
transaction. The measures that are taken should be consistent with any guidelines issued by competent authorities. For
higher risk categories, financial institutions should perform enhanced due diligence. In certain circumstances, where
there are low risks, countries may decide that financial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures.

Financial institutions should verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner before or during the
course of establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions for occasional customers. Countries may
permit financial institutions to complete the verification as soon as reasonably practicable following the establishment
of the relationship, where the money laundering risks are effectively managed and where this is essential not to interrupt
the normal conduct of business.

Where the financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs (a) to (c) above, it should not open the
account, commence business relations or perform the transaction; or should terminate the business relationship; and
should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer.

These requirements should apply to all new customers, though financial institutions should also apply this
Recommendation to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk, and should conduct due diligence on such
existing relationships at appropriate times.

The Glossary
“Beneficial owner” refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the person on
whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate effective control
over a legal person or arrangement.

Interpretative note to Recommendations 5, 12 and 16
The designated thresholds for transactions (under Recommendations 5 and 12) are as follows:
• Financial institutions (for occasional customers under Recommendation 5) - USD/EUR 15,000.
• Financial transactions above a designated threshold include situations where the transaction is carried out in a
  single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked.

Interpretative not to Recommendation 5

Customer due diligence and tipping off
1. If, during the establishment or course of the customer relationship, or when conducting occasional transactions, a
financial institution suspects that transactions relate to money laundering or terrorist financing, then the institution
should:
a) Normally seek to identify and verify the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner, whether permanent or occasional, and irrespective of any exemption or any designated threshold that might otherwise apply.
b) Make a STR to the FIU in accordance with Recommendation 13.

2. Recommendation 14 prohibits financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees from disclosing the fact that an STR or related information is being reported to the FIU. A risk exists that customers could be unintentionally tipped off when the financial institution is seeking to perform its customer due diligence (CDD) obligations in these circumstances. The customer’s awareness of a possible STR or investigation could compromise future efforts to investigate the suspected money laundering or terrorist financing operation.

3. Therefore, if financial institutions form a suspicion that transactions relate to money laundering or terrorist financing, they should take into account the risk of tipping off when performing the customer due diligence (CDD) process. If the institution reasonably believes that performing the CDD process will tip-off the customer or potential customer, it may choose not to pursue that process, and should file an STR. Institutions should ensure that their employees are aware of and sensitive to these issues when conducting CDD.

CDD for legal persons and arrangements
4. When performing elements (a) and (b) of the CDD process in relation to legal persons or arrangements, financial institutions should:
   a) Verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised, and identify that person.
   b) Identify the customer and verify its identity - the types of measures that would be normally needed to satisfactorily perform this function would require obtaining proof of incorporation or similar evidence of the legal status of the legal person or arrangement, as well as information concerning the customer’s name, the names of trustees, legal form, address, directors, and provisions regulating the power to bind the legal person or arrangement.
   c) Identify the beneficial owners, including forming an understanding of the ownership and control structure, and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of such persons. The types of measures that would be normally needed to satisfactorily perform this function would require identifying the natural persons with a controlling interest and identifying the natural persons who comprise the mind and management of the legal person or arrangement. Where the customer or the owner of the controlling interest is a public company that is subject to regulatory disclosure requirements, it is not necessary to seek to identify and verify the identity of any shareholder of that company.

Reliance on identification and verification already performed
5. The CDD measures set out in Recommendation 5 do not imply that financial institutions have to repeatedly identify and verify the identity of each customer every time that a customer conducts a transaction. An institution is entitled to rely on the identification and verification steps that it has already undertaken unless it has doubts about the veracity of that information. Examples of situations that might lead an institution to have such doubts could be where there is a suspicion of money laundering in relation to that customer, or where there is a material change in the way that the customer’s account is operated which is not consistent with the customer’s business profile.

Timing of verification
6. Examples of the types of circumstances where it would be permissible for verification to be completed after the establishment of the business relationship, because it would be essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business include:
   • Non face-to-face business.
   • Securities transactions. In the securities industry, companies and intermediaries may be required to perform transactions very rapidly, according to the market conditions at the time the customer is contacting them, and the performance of the transaction may be required before verification of identity is completed.
   • Life insurance business. In relation to life insurance business, countries may permit the identification and verification of the beneficiary under the policy to take place after having established the business relationship with the policyholder. However, in all such cases, identification and verification should occur at or before the time of payout or the time where the beneficiary intends to exercise vested rights under the policy.

7. Financial institutions will also need to adopt risk management procedures with respect to the conditions under which a customer may utilise the business relationship prior to verification. These procedures should include a set of measures such as a limitation of the number, types and/or amount of transactions that can be performed and the monitoring of large or complex transactions being carried out outside of expected norms for that type of relationship. Financial institutions should refer to the Basel CDD paper10 (section 2.2.6.) for specific guidance on examples of risk management measures for non-face to face business.
Requirement to identify existing customers
8. The principles set out in the Basel CDD paper (“Basel CDD paper” refers to the guidance paper on Customer Due Diligence for Banks issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in October 2001) concerning the identification of existing customers should serve as guidance when applying customer due diligence processes to institutions engaged in banking activity, and could apply to other financial institutions where relevant.

Simplified or reduced CDD measures
9. The general rule is that customers must be subject to the full range of CDD measures, including the requirement to identify the beneficial owner. Nevertheless there are circumstances where the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is lower, where information on the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner of a customer is publicly available, or where adequate checks and controls exist elsewhere in national systems. In such circumstances it could be reasonable for a country to allow its financial institutions to apply simplified or reduced CDD measures when identifying and verifying the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner.

10. Examples of customers where simplified or reduced CDD measures could apply are:
• Financial institutions – where they are subject to requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations and are supervised for compliance with those controls.
• Public companies that are subject to regulatory disclosure requirements.
• Government administrations or enterprises.

11. Simplified or reduced CDD measures could also apply to the beneficial owners of pooled accounts held by designated non financial businesses or professions provided that those businesses or professions are subject to requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations and are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring their compliance with those requirements. Banks should also refer to the Basel CDD paper (section 2.2.4.), which provides specific guidance concerning situations where an account holding institution may rely on a customer that is a professional financial intermediary to perform the customer due diligence on his or its own customers (i.e. the beneficial owners of the bank account). Where relevant, the CDD Paper could also provide guidance in relation to similar accounts held by other types of financial institutions.

12. Simplified CDD or reduced measures could also be acceptable for various types of products or transactions such as (examples only):
• Life insurance policies where the annual premium is no more than USD/EUR 1000 or a single premium of no more than USD/EUR 2500.
• Insurance policies for pension schemes if there is no surrender clause and the policy cannot be used as collateral.
• A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement benefits to employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages and the scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member’s interest under the scheme.

13. Countries could also decide whether financial institutions could apply these simplified measures only to customers in its own jurisdiction or allow them to do for customers from any other jurisdiction that the original country is satisfied is in compliance with and has effectively implemented the FATF Recommendations. Simplified CDD measures are not acceptable whenever there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing or specific higher risk scenarios apply.

Recommendation 6
Financial institutions should, in relation to politically exposed persons, in addition to performing normal due diligence measures:
a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person.
b) Obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with such customers.
c) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds.
d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 6
Countries are encouraged to extend the requirements of Recommendation 6 to individuals who hold prominent public functions in their own country.

The Glossary
“Politically Exposed Persons” (PEPs) are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials. Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs
themselves. The definition is not intended to cover middle ranking or more junior individuals in the foregoing categories.

**Recommendation 7**

Financial institutions should, in relation to cross-border correspondent banking and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal due diligence measures:

a) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action.

b) Assess the respondent institution’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing controls.

c) Obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent relationships.

d) Document the respective responsibilities of each institution.

e) With respect to “payable-through accounts”, be satisfied that the respondent bank has verified the identity of and performed on-going due diligence on the customers having direct access to accounts of the correspondent and that it is able to provide relevant customer identification data upon request to the correspondent bank.

Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names: they should be required (by law, by regulations, by agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or by self-regulatory agreements among financial institutions) to identify, on the basis of an official or other reliable identifying document, and record the identity of their clients, either occasional or usual, when establishing business relations or conducting transactions (in particular opening of accounts or passbooks, entering into fiduciary transactions, renting of safe deposit boxes, performing large cash transactions).

In order to fulfill identification requirements concerning legal entities, financial institutions should, when necessary, take measures:

- to verify the legal existence and structure of the customer by obtaining either from a public register or from the customer or both, proof of incorporation, including information concerning the customer's name, legal form, address, directors and provisions regulating the power to bind the entity.

- to verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised and identify that person.

**The Glossary**

“Payable-through accounts” refers to correspondent accounts that are used directly by third parties to transact business on their own behalf.

**Recommendation 9**

Countries may permit financial institutions to rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform elements (a) – (c) of the CDD process or to introduce business, provided that the criteria set out below are met. Where such reliance is permitted, the ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains with the financial institution relying on the third party.

The criteria that should be met are as follows:

a) A financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately obtain the necessary information concerning elements (a) – (c) of the CDD process. Financial institutions should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD requirements will be made available from the third party upon request without delay.

b) The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.

It is left to each country to determine in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based, having regard to information available on countries that do not or do not adequately apply the FATF Recommendations.

**Interpretative note to Recommendation 9**

This Recommendation does not apply to outsourcing or agency relationships.

This Recommendation also does not apply to relationships, accounts or transactions between financial institutions for their clients. Those relationships are addressed by Recommendations 5 and 7.

2.1.2 **Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Customer due diligence**

1. **Customer acceptance policy**

20. Banks should develop clear customer acceptance policies and procedures, including a description of the types of customer that are likely to pose a higher than average risk to a bank. In preparing such policies, factors such as customers’ background, country of origin, public or high profile position, linked accounts, business activities or other risk indicators should be considered. Banks should develop graduated customer acceptance policies and procedures that
require more extensive due diligence for higher risk customers. For example, the policies may require the most basic account-opening requirements for a working individual with a small account balance. It is important that the customer acceptance policy is not so restrictive that it results in a denial of access by the general public to banking services, especially for people who are financially or socially disadvantaged. On the other hand, quite extensive due diligence would be essential for an individual with a high net worth whose source of funds is unclear. Decisions to enter into business relationships with higher risk customers, such as politically exposed persons (see section 2.2.3 below), should be taken exclusively at senior management level.

2. Customer identification

21. Customer identification is an essential element of KYC standards. For the purposes of this paper, a customer includes:
- the person or entity that maintains an account with the bank or those on whose behalf an account is maintained (i.e. beneficial owners);
- the beneficiaries of transactions conducted by professional intermediaries; and
- any person or entity connected with a financial transaction who can pose a significant reputational or other risk to the bank.

22. Banks should establish a systematic procedure for identifying new customers and should not establish a banking relationship until the identity of a new customer is satisfactorily verified.

23. Banks should “document and enforce policies for identification of customers and those acting on their behalf”. The best documents for verifying the identity of customers are those most difficult to obtain illicitly and to counterfeit. Special attention should be exercised in the case of non-resident customers and in no case should a bank short-circuit identity procedures just because the new customer is unable to present himself for interview. The bank should always ask itself why the customer has chosen to open an account in a foreign jurisdiction.

24. The customer identification process applies naturally at the outset of the relationship. To ensure that records remain up-to-date and relevant, there is a need for banks to undertake regular reviews of existing records. An appropriate time to do so is when a transaction of significance takes place, when customer documentation standards change substantially, or when there is a material change in the way that the account is operated. However, if a bank becomes aware at any time that it lacks sufficient information about an existing customer, it should take steps to ensure that all relevant information is obtained as quickly as possible.

25. Banks that offer private banking services are particularly exposed to reputational risk, and should therefore apply enhanced due diligence to such operations. Private banking accounts, which by nature involve a large measure of confidentiality, can be opened in the name of an individual, a commercial business, a trust, an intermediary or a personalised investment company. In each case reputational risk may arise if the bank does not diligently follow established KYC procedures. All new clients and new accounts should be approved by at least one person, of appropriate seniority, other than the private banking relationship manager. If particular safeguards are put in place internally to protect confidentiality of private banking customers and their business, banks must still ensure that at least equivalent scrutiny and monitoring of these customers and their business can be conducted, e.g. they must be open to review by compliance officers and auditors.

2.1 General identification requirements

27. Banks need to obtain all information necessary to establish to their full satisfaction the identity of each new customer and the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. The extent and nature of the information depends on the type of applicant (personal, corporate, etc.) and the expected size of the account. National supervisors are encouraged to provide guidance to assist banks in designing their own identification procedures. The Working Group intends to develop essential elements of customer identification requirements.

28. When an account has been opened, but problems of verification arise in the banking relationship which cannot be resolved, the bank should close the account and return the monies to the source from which they were received.

29. While the transfer of an opening balance from an account in the customer’s name in another bank subject to the same KYC standard may provide some comfort, banks should nevertheless consider the possibility that the previous account manager may have asked for the account to be removed because of a concern about dubious activities. Naturally, customers have the right to move their business from one bank to another. However, if a bank has any reason to believe that an applicant is being refused banking facilities by another bank, it should apply enhanced diligence procedures to the customer.

30. Banks should never agree to open an account or conduct ongoing business with a customer who insists on anonymity or who gives a fictitious name. Nor should confidential numbered accounts function as anonymous accounts but they should be subject to exactly the same KYC procedures as all other customer accounts, even if the test is carried
out by selected staff. Whereas a numbered account can offer additional protection for the identity of the account-holder, the identity must be known to a sufficient number of staff to operate proper due diligence. Such accounts should in no circumstances be used to hide the customer identity from a bank’s compliance function or from the supervisors.

2.2.1 Trust, nominee and fiduciary accounts
32. Trust, nominee and fiduciary accounts can be used to circumvent customer identification procedures. While it may be legitimate under certain circumstances to provide an extra layer of security to protect the confidentiality of legitimate private banking customers, it is essential that the true relationship is understood. Banks should establish whether the customer is taking the name of another customer, acting as a "front", or acting on behalf of another person as trustee, nominee or other intermediary. If so, a necessary precondition is receipt of satisfactory evidence of the identity of any intermediaries, and of the persons upon whose behalf they are acting, as well as details of the nature of the trust or other arrangements in place. Specifically, the identification of a trust should include the trustees, settlors/grantors and beneficiaries.

2.2.2 Corporate vehicles
33. Banks need to be vigilant in preventing corporate business entities from being used by natural persons as a method of operating anonymous accounts. Personal asset holding vehicles, such as international business companies, may make proper identification of customers or beneficial owners difficult. A bank should understand the structure of the company, determine the source of funds, and identify the beneficial owners and those who have control over the funds.

34. Special care needs to be exercised in initiating business transactions with companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form. Satisfactory evidence of the identity of beneficial owners of all such companies needs to be obtained. In the case of entities which have a significant proportion of capital in the form of bearer shares, extra vigilance is called for. A bank may be completely unaware that the bearer shares have changed hands. The onus is on banks to put in place satisfactory procedures to monitor the identity of material beneficial owners. This may require the bank to immobilise the shares, e.g. by holding the bearer shares in custody.

2.2.3 Introduced business
35. The performance of identification procedures can be time consuming and there is a natural desire to limit any inconvenience for new customers. In some countries, it has therefore become customary for banks to rely on the procedures undertaken by other banks or introducers when business is being referred. In doing so, banks risk placing excessive reliance on the due diligence procedures that they expect the introducers to have performed. Relying on due diligence conducted by an introducer, however reputable, does not in any way remove the ultimate responsibility of the recipient bank to know its customers and their business. In particular, banks should not rely on introducers that are subject to weaker standards than those governing the banks’ own KYC procedures or that are unwilling to share copies of due diligence documentation.

36. The Basel Committee recommends that banks that use introducers should carefully assess whether the introducers are “fit and proper” and are exercising the necessary due diligence in accordance with the standards set out in this paper. The ultimate responsibility for knowing customers always lies with the bank. Banks should use the following criteria to determine whether an introducer can be relied upon:
• it must comply with the minimum customer due diligence practices identified in this paper;
• the customer due diligence procedures of the introducer should be as rigorous as those which the bank would have conducted itself for the customer;
• the bank must satisfy itself as to the reliability of the systems put in place by the introducer to verify the identity of the customer;
• the bank must reach agreement with the introducer that it will be permitted to verify the due diligence undertaken by the introducer at any stage; and
• all relevant identification data and other documentation pertaining to the customer's identity should be immediately submitted by the introducer to the bank, who must carefully review the documentation provided. Such information must be available for review by the supervisor and the financial intelligence unit or equivalent enforcement agency, where appropriate legal authority has been obtained.
In addition, banks should conduct periodic reviews to ensure that an introducer which it relies on continues to conform to the criteria set out above.

2.2.4 Client accounts opened by professional intermediaries
37. When a bank has knowledge or reason to believe that a client account opened by a professional intermediary is on behalf of a single client, that client must be identified.

38. Banks often hold “pooled” accounts managed by professional intermediaries on behalf of entities such as mutual funds, pension funds and money funds. Banks also hold pooled accounts managed by lawyers or stockbrokers that represent funds held on deposit or in escrow for a range of clients. Where funds held by the intermediary are not co-
mingled at the bank, but where there are “sub-accounts” which can be attributable to each beneficial owner, all beneficial owners of the account held by the intermediary must be identified.

39. Where the funds are co-mingled, the bank should look through to the beneficial owners. There can be circumstances where the bank may not need to look beyond the intermediary, for example, when the intermediary is subject to the same regulatory and money laundering legislation and procedures, and in particular is subject to the same due diligence standards in respect of its client base as the bank. National supervisory guidance should clearly set out those circumstances in which banks need not look beyond the intermediary. Banks should accept such accounts only on the condition that they are able to establish that the intermediary has engaged in a sound due diligence process and has the systems and controls to allocate the assets in the pooled accounts to the relevant beneficiaries. In assessing the due diligence process of the intermediary, the bank should apply the criteria set out in paragraph 36 above, in respect of introduced business, in order to determine whether a professional intermediary can be relied upon.

40. Where the intermediary is not empowered to furnish the required information on beneficiaries to the bank, for example, lawyers bound by professional secrecy codes or when that intermediary is not subject to due diligence standards equivalent to those set out in this paper or to the requirements of comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, then the bank should not permit the intermediary to open an account.

2.2.5 Politically exposed persons
41. Business relationships with individuals holding important public positions and with persons or companies clearly related to them may expose a bank to significant reputational and/or legal risks. Such politically exposed persons (“PEPs”) are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions, including heads of state or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of publicly owned corporations and important political party officials. There is always a possibility, especially in countries where corruption is widespread, that such persons abuse their public powers for their own illicit enrichment through the receipt of bribes, embezzlement, etc.

42. Accepting and managing funds from corrupt PEPs will severely damage the bank’s own reputation and can undermine public confidence in the ethical standards of an entire financial centre, since such cases usually receive extensive media attention and strong political reaction, even if the illegal origin of the assets is often difficult to prove. In addition, the bank may be subject to costly information requests and seizure orders from law enforcement or judicial authorities (including international mutual assistance procedures in criminal matters) and could be liable to actions for damages by the state concerned or the victims of a regime. Under certain circumstances, the bank and/or its officers and employees themselves can be exposed to charges of money laundering, if they know or should have known that the funds stemmed from corruption or other serious crimes.

43. Some countries have recently amended or are in the process of amending their laws and regulations to criminalise active corruption of foreign civil servants and public officers in accordance with the relevant international convention. In these jurisdictions foreign corruption becomes a predicate offence for money laundering and all the relevant anti-money laundering laws and regulations apply (e.g. reporting of suspicious transactions, prohibition on informing the customer, internal freeze of funds etc). But even in the absence of such an explicit legal basis in criminal law, it is clearly undesirable, unethical and incompatible with the fit and proper conduct of banking operations to accept or maintain a business relationship if the bank knows or must assume that the funds derive from corruption or misuse of public assets. There is a compelling need for a bank considering a relationship with a person whom it suspects of being a PEP to identify that person fully, as well as people and companies that are clearly related to him/her.

44. Banks should gather sufficient information from a new customer, and check publicly available information, in order to establish whether or not the customer is a PEP. Banks should investigate the source of funds before accepting a PEP. The decision to open an account for a PEP should be taken at a senior management level.

2.2.6 Non-face-to-face customers
45. Banks are increasingly asked to open accounts on behalf of customers who do not present themselves for personal interview. This has always been a frequent event in the case of non-resident customers, but it has increased significantly with the recent expansion of postal, telephone and electronic banking. Banks should apply equally effective customer identification procedures and on-going monitoring standards for non-face-to-face customers as for those available for interview. One issue that has arisen in this connection is the possibility of independent verification by a reputable third party. This whole subject of non-face-to-face customer identification is being discussed by the FATF, and is also under review in the context of amending the 1991 EEC Directive.

46. A typical example of a non-face-to-face customer is one who wishes to conduct electronic banking via the Internet or similar technology. Electronic banking currently incorporates a wide array of products and services delivered over telecommunications networks. The impersonal and borderless nature of electronic banking combined with the speed of the transaction inevitably creates difficulty in customer identification and verification. As a basic policy, supervisors
expect that banks should proactively assess various risks posed by emerging technologies and design customer identification procedures with due regard to such risks.

47. Even though the same documentation can be provided by face-to-face and non-face-to-face customers, there is a greater difficulty in matching the customer with the documentation in the case of non-face-to-face customers. With telephone and electronic banking, the verification problem is made even more difficult.

48. In accepting business from non-face-to-face customers:

- banks should apply equally effective customer identification procedures for non-face-to-face customers as for those available for interview; and
- there must be specific and adequate measures to mitigate the higher risk.

Examples of measures to mitigate risk include:

- certification of documents presented;
- requisition of additional documents to complement those which are required for face-to-face customers;
- independent contact with the customer by the bank;
- third party introduction, e.g. by an introducer subject to the criteria established in paragraph 36; or
- requiring the first payment to be carried out through an account in the customer’s name with another bank subject to similar customer due diligence standards.

2.2.7 Correspondent banking

49. Correspondent banking is the provision of banking services by one bank (the “correspondent bank”) to another bank (the “respondent bank”). Used by banks throughout the world, correspondent accounts enable banks to conduct business and provide services that the banks do not offer directly. Correspondent accounts that merit particular care involve the provision of services in jurisdictions where the respondent banks have no physical presence. However, if banks fail to apply an appropriate level of due diligence to such accounts, they expose themselves to the range of risks identified earlier in this paper, and may find themselves holding and/or transmitting money linked to corruption, fraud or other illegal activity.

50. Banks should gather sufficient information about their respondent banks to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business. Factors to consider include: information about the respondent bank’s management, major business activities, where they are located and its money-laundering prevention and detection efforts; the purpose of the account; the identity of any third party entities that will use the correspondent banking services; and the condition of bank regulation and supervision in the respondent’s country. Banks should only establish correspondent relationships with foreign banks that are effectively supervised by the relevant authorities. For their part, respondent banks should have effective customer acceptance and KYC policies.

51. In particular, banks should refuse to enter into or continue a correspondent banking relationship with a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial group (i.e. shell banks). Banks should pay particular attention when continuing relationships with respondent banks located in jurisdictions that have poor KYC standards or have been identified as being “non-cooperative” in the fight against anti-money laundering. Banks should establish that their correspondent banks have due diligence standards as set out in this paper, and employ enhanced due diligence procedures with respect to transactions carried out through the correspondent accounts.

52. Banks should be particularly alert to the risk that correspondent accounts might be used directly by third parties to transact business on their own behalf (e.g. payable-through accounts). Such arrangements give rise to most of the same considerations applicable to introduced business and should be treated in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 36.

3. On-going monitoring of accounts and transactions

53. On-going monitoring is an essential aspect of effective KYC procedures. Banks can only effectively control and reduce their risk if they have an understanding of normal and reasonable account activity of their customers so that they have a means of identifying transactions which fall outside the regular pattern of an account’s activity. Without such knowledge, they are likely to fail in their duty to report suspicious transactions to the appropriate authorities in cases where they are required to do so. The extent of the monitoring needs to be risk-sensitive. For all accounts, banks should have systems in place to detect unusual or suspicious patterns of activity. This can be done by establishing limits for a particular class or category of accounts. Particular attention should be paid to transactions that exceed these limits. Certain types of transactions should alert banks to the possibility that the customer is conducting unusual or suspicious activities. They may include transactions that do not appear to make economic or commercial sense, or that involve large amounts of cash deposits that are not consistent with the normal and expected transactions of the customer. Very high account turnover, inconsistent with the size of the balance, may indicate that funds are being “washed” through the
account. Examples of suspicious activities can be very helpful to banks and should be included as part of a jurisdiction’s anti-money-laundering procedures and/or guidance.

54. There should be intensified monitoring for higher risk accounts. Every bank should set key indicators for such accounts, taking note of the background of the customer, such as the country of origin and source of funds, the type of transactions involved, and other risk factors. For higher risk accounts:

- Banks should ensure that they have adequate management information systems to provide managers and compliance officers with timely information needed to identify, analyse and effectively monitor higher risk customer accounts. The types of reports that may be needed include reports of missing account opening documentation, transactions made through a customer account that are unusual, and aggregations of a customer’s total relationship with the bank.
- Senior management in charge of private banking business should know the personal circumstances of the bank’s high risk customers and be alert to sources of third party information. Significant transactions by these customers should be approved by a senior manager.
- Banks should develop a clear policy and internal guidelines, procedures and controls and remain especially vigilant regarding business relationships with PEPs and high profile individuals or with persons and companies that are clearly related to or associated with them. As all PEPs may not be identified initially and since existing customers may subsequently acquire PEP status, regular reviews of at least the more important customers should be undertaken.

2.1.3 Wolfsberg AML Principles

1 Client acceptance: general guidelines - 1.1 General
Bank policy will be to prevent the use of its worldwide operations for criminal purposes. The bank will endeavor to accept only those clients whose source of wealth and funds can be reasonably established to be legitimate. The primary responsibility for this lies with the private banker who sponsors the client for acceptance. Mere fulfillment of internal review procedures does not relieve the private banker of this basic responsibility.

1.2 Identification
The bank will take reasonable measures to establish the identity of its clients and beneficial owners and will only accept clients when this process has been completed.

1.2.1 Client
- Natural persons: identity will be established to the bank’s satisfaction by reference to official identity papers or such other evidence as may be appropriate under the circumstances.
- Corporations, partnerships, foundations: the bank will receive documentary evidence of the due organization and existence.
- Trusts: the bank will receive appropriate evidence of formation and existence along with identity of the trustees.
- Identification documents must be current at the time of opening.

1.2.2 Beneficial owner
Beneficial ownership must be established for all accounts. Due diligence must be done on all principal beneficial owners identified in accordance with the following principles:

- Natural persons: when the account is in the name of an individual, the private banker must establish whether the client is acting on his/her own behalf. If doubt exists, the bank will establish the capacity in which and on whose behalf the accountholder is acting.
- Legal entities: where the client is a company, such as a private investment company, the private banker will understand the structure of the company sufficiently to determine the provider of funds, principal owner(s) of the shares and those who have control over the funds, e.g. the directors and those with the power to give direction to the directors of the company. With regard to other shareholders the private banker will make a reasonable judgement as to the need for further due diligence. This principle applies regardless of whether the share capital is in registered or bearer form.
- Trusts: where the client is a trustee, the private banker will understand the structure of the trust sufficiently to determine the provider of funds (e.g. settlor) those who have control over the funds (e.g. trustees) and any persons or entities who have the power to remove the trustees. The private banker will make a reasonable judgement as to the need for further due diligence.
- Unincorporated associations: the above principles apply to unincorporated associations.
1.2.3 Accounts held in the name of money managers and similar intermediaries
The private banker will perform due diligence on the intermediary and establish that the intermediary has a due diligence process for its clients, or a regulatory obligation to conduct such due diligence, that is satisfactory to the bank.

1.2.4 Powers of attorney/Authorized signers
Where the holder of a power of attorney or another authorized signer is appointed by a client, it is generally sufficient to do due diligence on the client.

1.2.5 Practices for walk-in clients and electronic banking relationships
A bank will determine whether walk-in clients or relationships initiated through electronic channels require a higher degree of due diligence prior to account opening.

1.3 Due diligence
It is essential to collect and record information covering the following categories:
- Purpose and reasons for opening the account
- Anticipated account activity
- Source of wealth (description of the economic activity which has generated the net worth)
- Estimated net worth
- Source of funds (description of the origin and the means of transfer for monies that are accepted for the account opening)
- References or other sources to corroborate reputation information where available.

Unless other measures reasonably suffice to do the due diligence on a client (e.g. favorable and reliable references), a client will be met prior to account opening.

1.4 Oversight responsibility
There will be a requirement that all new clients and new accounts be approved by at least one person other than the private banker.

2 Client acceptance: situations requiring additional diligence/attention -

2.1 Numbered or alternate name accounts
Numbered or alternate name accounts will only be accepted if the bank has established the identity of the client and the beneficial owner.

2.2 High-risk countries
The bank will apply heightened scrutiny to clients and beneficial owners resident in and funds sourced from countries identified by credible sources as having inadequate anti-money-laundering standards or representing high-risk for crime and corruption.

2.3 Offshore jurisdictions
Risks associated with entities organized in offshore jurisdictions are covered by due diligence procedures laid out in these guidelines.

2.4 High-risk activities
Clients and beneficial owners whose source of wealth emanates from activities known to be susceptible to money laundering will be subject to heightened scrutiny.

2.5 Public officials
Individuals who have or have had positions of public trust such as government officials, senior executives of government corporations, politicians, important political party officials, etc. and their families and close associates require heightened scrutiny.

3 Updating client files
The private banker is responsible for updating the client file on a defined basis and/or when there are major changes. The private banker's supervisor or an independent control person will review relevant portions of client files on a regular basis to ensure consistency and completeness. The frequency of the reviews depends on the size, complexity and risk posed of the relationship.


Article 3
1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive require identification of their customers by means of supporting evidence when entering into business relations, particularly, in the case of the institutions, when opening an account or savings accounts, or when offering safe custody facilities.
2. The identification requirement shall also apply for any transaction with customers other than those referred to in paragraph 1, involving a sum amounting to EUR 15 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which seem to be linked. Where the sum is not known at the time when the transaction is undertaken, the institution or person concerned shall proceed with identification as soon as it or he is apprised of the sum and establishes that the threshold has been reached.

3. By way of derogation from the preceding paragraphs, the identification requirements with regard to insurance policies written by insurance undertakings within the meaning of Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance (third life assurance Directive), where they perform activities which fall within the scope of that Directive shall not be required where the periodic premium amount or amounts to be paid in any given year does or do not exceed EUR 1 000 or where a single premium is paid amounting to EUR 2 500 or less. If the periodic premium amount or amounts to be paid in any given year is or are increased so as to exceed the EUR 1 000 threshold, identification shall be required.

4. Member States may provide that the identification requirement is not compulsory for insurance policies in respect of pension schemes taken out by virtue of a contract of employment or the insured's occupation, provided that such policies contain no surrender clause and may not be used as collateral for a loan.

5. By way of derogation from the preceding paragraphs, all casino customers shall be identified if they purchase or sell gambling chips with a value of EUR 1 000 or more.

6. Casinos subject to State supervision shall be deemed in any event to have complied with the identification requirement laid down in this Directive if they register and identify their customers immediately on entry, regardless of the number of gambling chips purchased.

7. In the event of doubt as to whether the customers referred to in the above paragraphs are acting on their own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, the institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall take reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting.

8. The institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall carry out such identification, even where the amount of the transaction is lower than the threshold laid down, wherever there is suspicion of money laundering.

9. The institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall not be subject to the identification requirements provided for in this Article where the customer is a credit or financial institution covered by this Directive or a credit or financial institution situated in a third country which imposes, in the opinion of the relevant Member States, equivalent requirements to those laid down by this Directive.

10. Member States may provide that the identification requirements regarding transactions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 are fulfilled when it is established that the payment for the transaction is to be debited from an account opened in the customer's name with a credit institution subject to this Directive according to the requirements of paragraph 1.

11. Member States shall, in any case, ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive take specific and adequate measures necessary to compensate for the greater risk of money laundering which arises when establishing business relations or entering into a transaction with a customer who has not been physically present for identification purposes ("non-face to face operations"). Such measures shall ensure that the customer's identity is established, for example, by requiring additional documentary evidence, or supplementary measures to verify or certify the documents supplied, or confirmatory certification by an institution subject to this Directive, or by requiring that the first payment of the operations is carried out through an account opened in the customer's name with a credit institution subject to this Directive. The internal control procedures laid down in Article 11 (1) shall take specific account of these measures.

12. In the event of doubt as to whether the customers referred to in the above paragraphs are acting on their own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, the institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall take reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting.

13. The improvement of internal banking monitoring and research systems is of the utmost importance in order to improve the identification of transfers of funds used for financing terrorist acts. The "Customer due diligence for banks" recommendations developed by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, which came into force in October 2001, give guidance in the area of customer identification and ongoing account monitoring, which can also be used for this purpose. Therefore this recommendation, together with the FATF recommendations, should become a standard in all credit institutions in the European Union.

2.1.5 2001 Joint ECOFIN/JHA meeting

13. The improvement of internal banking monitoring and research systems is of the utmost importance in order to improve the identification of transfers of funds used for financing terrorist acts. The "Customer due diligence for banks" recommendations developed by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, which came into force in October 2001, give guidance in the area of customer identification and ongoing account monitoring, which can also be used for this purpose. Therefore this recommendation, together with the FATF recommendations, should become a standard in all credit institutions in the European Union.
3 RECORD KEEPING

3.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 10
Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.

Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data obtained through the customer due diligence process (e.g. copies or records of official identification documents like passports, identity cards, driving licenses or similar documents), account files and business correspondence for at least five years after the business relationship is ended.

The identification data and transaction records should be available to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority.

Interpretative note to Recommendations 10 and 11
In relation to insurance business, the word “transactions” should be understood to refer to the insurance product itself, the premium payment and the benefits.

3.1.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Customer due diligence

26. Banks should develop “clear standards on what records must be kept on customer identification and individual transactions and their retention period”. Such a practice is essential to permit a bank to monitor its relationship with the customer, to understand the customer’s on-going business and, if necessary, to provide evidence in the event of disputes, legal action, or a financial investigation that could lead to criminal prosecution. As the starting point and natural follow-up of the identification process, banks should obtain customer identification papers and retain copies of them for at least five years after an account is closed. They should also retain all financial transaction records for at least five years after the transaction has taken place.

3.1.3 Wolfsberg AML Principles

9 Record retention requirements
The bank will establish record retention requirements for all anti-money-laundering related documents. The documents must be kept for a minimum of five years.


Article 4
Member States shall ensure that credit and financial institutions keep the following for use as evidence in any investigation into money laundering:
- in the case of identification, a copy or the references of the evidence required, for a period of at least five years after the relationship with their customer has ended,
- in the case of transactions, the supporting evidence and records, consisting of the original documents or copies admissible in court proceedings under the applicable national legislation for a period of at least five years following execution of the transactions.
4 REPORTING

4.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 13
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU).

Interpretative note to Recommendation 13
1. The reference to criminal activity in Recommendation 13 refers to:
   a) all criminal acts that would constitute a predicate offence for money laundering in the jurisdiction; or
   b) at a minimum to those offences that would constitute a predicate offence as required by Recommendation 1.

Countries are strongly encouraged to adopt alternative (a). All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction.

2. In implementing Recommendation 13, suspicious transactions should be reported by financial institutions regardless of whether they are also thought to involve tax matters. Countries should take into account that, in order to deter financial institutions from reporting a suspicious transaction, money launderers may seek to state inter alia that their transactions relate to tax matters.

Recommendation 19
Countries should consider:
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b) The feasibility and utility of a system where banks and other financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central agency with a computerised data base, available to competent authorities for use in money laundering or terrorist financing cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 19
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2. If a country discovers an unusual international shipment of currency, monetary instruments, precious metals, or gems, etc., it should consider notifying, as appropriate, the Customs Service or other competent authorities of the countries from which the shipment originated and/or to which it is destined, and should co-operate with a view toward establishing the source, destination, and purpose of such shipment and toward the taking of appropriate action.

The Glossary
“STR” refers to suspicious transaction reports.

4.1.2 Wolfsberg AML Principles

4 Practices when identifying unusual or suspicious activities
4.1 Definition of unusual or suspicious activities
The bank will have a written policy on the identification of and follow-up on unusual or suspicious activities. This policy will include a definition of what is considered to be suspicious or unusual and give examples thereof.

Unusual or suspicious activities may include:
- Account transactions or other activities which are not consistent with the due diligence file
- Cash transactions over a certain amount
- Pass-through / in-and-out-transactions.

4.2 Identification of unusual or suspicious activities
Unusual or suspicious activities can be identified through:
- Monitoring of transactions
- Client contacts (meetings, discussions, in-country visits etc.)
- Third party information (e.g. newspapers, Reuters, internet)
- Private banker's / internal knowledge of the client's environment (e.g. political situation in his/her country)

4.3 Follow-up on unusual or suspicious activities
The private banker, management and/or the control function will carry out an analysis of the background of any unusual or suspicious activity. If there is no plausible explanation a decision will be made involving the control function:
- To continue the business relationship with increased monitoring
- To cancel the business relationship
- To report the business relationship to the authorities.

The report to the authorities is made by the control function and senior management may need to be notified (e.g., Senior Compliance Officer, CEO, Chief Auditor, General Counsel). As required by local laws and regulations, the assets may be blocked and transactions may be subject to approval by the control function.


Article 6

1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive and their directors and employees cooperate fully with the authorities responsible for combating money laundering:
   (a) by informing those authorities, on their own initiative, of any fact which might be an indication of money laundering;
   (b) by furnishing those authorities, at their request, with all necessary information, in accordance with the procedures established by the applicable legislation.

2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be forwarded to the authorities responsible for combating money laundering of the Member State in whose territory the institution or person forwarding the information is situated. The person or persons designated by the institutions and persons in accordance with the procedures provided for in Article 11(1)(a) shall normally forward the information.

3. In the case of the notaries and independent legal professionals referred to in Article 2a(5), Member States may designate an appropriate self-regulatory body of the profession concerned as the authority to be informed of the facts referred to in paragraph 1(a) and in such case shall lay down the appropriate forms of cooperation between that body and the authorities responsible for combating money laundering.

Member States shall not be obliged to apply the obligations laid down in paragraph 1 to notaries, independent legal professionals, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors with regard to information they receive from or obtain on one of their clients, in the course of ascertaining the legal position for their client or performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial proceedings, including advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings, whether such information is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings.
5 Failing to report and tipping off

5.1 Prohibition


Article 2
Member States shall ensure that money laundering as defined in this Directive is prohibited.

5.2 Special attention

5.2.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 8
Financial institutions should pay special attention to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies that might favour anonymity, and take measures, if needed, to prevent their use in money laundering schemes. In particular, financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated with nonface to face business relationships or transactions.

Recommendation 11
Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities and auditors.

Interpretative note to Recommendations 10 and 11
In relation to insurance business, the word “transactions” should be understood to refer to the insurance product itself, the premium payment and the benefits.

Recommendation 21
Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures.

5.2.2 Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering (91/308/EEC)

Article 5
Member States shall ensure that credit and financial institutions examine with special attention any transaction which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to money laundering.
5.3 No tipping off

5.3.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

**Recommendation 14**
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be:
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b) Prohibited by law from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being reported to the FIU.

**Interpretative note to Recommendation 14** (tipping off)
Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants acting as independent legal professionals seek to dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this does not amount to tipping off.


**Article 8**
1. Credit and financial institutions and their directors and employees shall not disclose to the customer concerned nor to other third persons that information has been transmitted to the authorities in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 or that a money laundering investigation is being carried out.
2. Member States shall not be obliged under this Directive to apply the obligation laid down in paragraph 1 to the professions mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 6(3).

5.4 Sanctions or penalties

5.4.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

**Recommendation 17**
Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, are available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by these Recommendations that fail to comply with anti-money laundering or terrorist financing requirements.

5.4.2 Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering (91/308/EEC)

**Article 14**
Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure full application of all the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures adopted pursuant to this Directive.
INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEM/TRAINING/EDUCATION

6.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 15
Financial institutions should develop programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing. These programmes should include:

a) The development of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance management arrangements, and adequate screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.
b) An ongoing employee training programme.
c) An audit function to test the system.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 15
The type and extent of measures to be taken for each of the requirements set out in the Recommendation should be appropriate having regard to the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing and the size of the business.

For financial institutions, compliance management arrangements should include the appointment of a compliance officer at the management level.

6.1.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Customer due diligence

4. Risk management

55. Effective KYC procedures embrace routines for proper management oversight, systems and controls, segregation of duties, training and other related policies. The board of directors of the bank should be fully committed to an effective KYC programme by establishing appropriate procedures and ensuring their effectiveness. Explicit responsibility should be allocated within the bank for ensuring that the bank's policies and procedures are managed effectively and are, at a minimum, in accordance with local supervisory practice. The channels for reporting suspicious transactions should be clearly specified in writing, and communicated to all personnel. There should also be internal procedures for assessing whether the bank’s statutory obligations under recognised suspicious activity reporting regimes require the transaction to be reported to the appropriate law enforcement and and/or supervisory authorities.

56. Banks' internal audit and compliance functions have important responsibilities in evaluating and ensuring adherence to KYC policies and procedures. As a general rule, the compliance function should provide an independent evaluation of the bank’s own policies and procedures, including legal and regulatory requirements. Its responsibilities should include ongoing monitoring of staff performance through sample testing of compliance and review of exception reports to alert senior management or the Board of Directors if it believes management is failing to address KYC procedures in a responsible manner.

57. Internal audit plays an important role in independently evaluating the risk management and controls, discharging its responsibility to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors or a similar oversight body through periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of compliance with KYC policies and procedures, including related staff training. Management should ensure that audit functions are staffed adequately with individuals who are well-versed in such policies and procedures. In addition, internal auditors should be proactive in following-up their findings and criticisms.

58. All banks must have an ongoing employee-training programme so that bank staff are adequately trained in KYC procedures. The timing and content of training for various sectors of staff will need to be adapted by the bank for its own needs. Training requirements should have a different focus for new staff, front-line staff, compliance staff or staff dealing with new customers. New staff should be educated in the importance of KYC policies and the basic requirements at the bank. Front-line staff members who deal directly with the public should be trained to verify the identity of new customers, to exercise due diligence in handling accounts of existing customers on an ongoing basis and to detect patterns of suspicious activity. Regular refresher training should be provided to ensure that staff are reminded of their responsibilities and are kept informed of new developments. It is crucial that all relevant staff fully understand the need for and implement KYC policies consistently. A culture within banks that promotes such understanding is the key to successful implementation.

59. In many countries, external auditors also have an important role to play in monitoring banks’ internal controls and procedures, and in confirming that they are in compliance with supervisory practice.
6.1.3 Wolfsberg AML Principles

5 Monitoring
A sufficient monitoring program must be in place. The primary responsibility for monitoring account activities lies with the private banker. The private banker will be familiar with significant transactions and increased activity in the account and will be especially aware of unusual or suspicious activities (see 4.1). The bank will decide to what extent fulfillment of these responsibilities will need to be supported through the use of automated systems or other means.

6 Control responsibilities
A written control policy will be in place establishing standard control procedures to be undertaken by the various "control layers" (private banker, independent operations unit, Compliance, Internal Audit). The control policy will cover issues of timing, degree of control, areas to be controlled, responsibilities and follow-up etc.

7 Reporting
There will be regular management reporting established on money laundering issues (e.g. number of reports to authorities, monitoring tools, changes in applicable laws and regulations, the number and scope of training sessions provided to employees).

8 Education, training and information
The bank will establish a training program on the identification and prevention of money laundering for employees who have client contact and for Compliance personnel. Regular training (e.g. annually) will also include how to identify and follow-up on unusual or suspicious activities. In addition, employees will be informed about any major changes in anti-money-laundering laws and regulations.

All new employees will be provided with guidelines on the anti-money-laundering procedures.

11 Anti-money-laundering organization
The bank will establish an adequately staffed and independent department responsible for the prevention of money laundering (e.g. Compliance, independent control unit, Legal).


Article 11
1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive:
   (a) establish adequate procedures of internal control and communication in order to forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering;
   (b) take appropriate measures so that their employees are aware of the provisions contained in this Directive. These measures shall include participation of their relevant employees in special training programmes to help them recognise operations which may be related to money laundering as well as to instruct them as to how to proceed in such cases.
   Where a natural person falling within any of Article 2a(3) to (7) undertakes his professional activities as an employee of a legal person, the obligations in this Article shall apply to that legal person rather than to the natural person.

2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive have access to up-to-date information on the practices of money launderers and on indications leading to the recognition of suspicious transactions.

6.1.5 1998 EU Joint Action on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime

Article 6
1. Member States shall ensure that arrangements are in place to acquaint their judiciary with best practice in international cooperation in the identification, tracing, freezing or seizing, and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime.

2. Member States shall ensure that appropriate training, reflecting best practice, is provided to all investigators, investigating magistrates, prosecutors and other officials concerned with international cooperation in asset identification, tracing, freezing or seizing and confiscation matters.
7 SUPERVISION

7.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 23
Countries should ensure that financial institutions are subject to adequate regulation and supervision and are effectively implementing the FATF Recommendations. Competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in a financial institution.

For financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, the regulatory and supervisory measures that apply for prudential purposes and which are also relevant to money laundering, should apply in a similar manner for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing purposes.

Other financial institutions should be licensed or registered and appropriately regulated, and subject to supervision or oversight for anti-money laundering purposes, having regard to the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in that sector. At a minimum, businesses providing a service of money or value transfer, or of money or currency changing should be licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 23
Recommendation 23 should not be read as to require the introduction of a system of regular review of licensing of controlling interests in financial institutions merely for anti-money laundering purposes, but as to stress the desirability of suitability review for controlling shareholders in financial institutions (banks and non-banks in particular) from a FATF point of view. Hence, where shareholder suitability (or “fit and proper”) tests exist, the attention of supervisors should be drawn to their relevance for anti-money laundering purposes.

The Glossary
“Core Principles” refers to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Insurance Supervisory Principles issued by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.

“Supervisors” refers to the designated competent authorities responsible for ensuring compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Recommendation 24
Designated non-financial businesses and professions should be subject to regulatory and supervisory measures as set out below.

a) Casinos should be subject to a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime that ensures that they have effectively implemented the necessary anti-money laundering and terrorist-financing measures. At a minimum:
   • casinos should be licensed;
   • competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest, holding a management function in, or being an operator of a casino
   • competent authorities should ensure that casinos are effectively supervised for compliance with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

b) Countries should ensure that the other categories of designated non-financial businesses and professions are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring their compliance with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This may be performed by a government authority or by an appropriate self-regulatory organisation, provided that such an organisation can ensure that its members comply with their obligations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Recommendation 25
The competent authorities should establish guidelines, and provide feedback which will assist financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions in applying national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.

Interpretative note to recommendation 25
When considering the feedback that should be provided, countries should have regard to the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons.

Recommendation 29
Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, including the authority to conduct inspections. They should be
authorised to compel production of any information from financial institutions that is relevant to monitoring such compliance, and to impose adequate administrative sanctions for failure to comply with such requirements.

7.1.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Customer due diligence

IV. The role of supervisors

60. Based on existing international KYC standards, national supervisors are expected to set out supervisory practice governing banks’ KYC programmes. The essential elements as presented in this paper should provide clear guidance for supervisors to proceed with the work of designing or improving national supervisory practice.

61. In addition to setting out the basic elements for banks to follow, supervisors have a responsibility to monitor that banks are applying sound KYC procedures and are sustaining ethical and professional standards on a continuous basis. Supervisors should ensure that appropriate internal controls are in place and that banks are in compliance with supervisory and regulatory guidance. The supervisory process should include not only a review of policies and procedures but also a review of customer files and the sampling of some accounts. Supervisors should always have the right to access all documentation related to accounts maintained in that jurisdiction, including any analysis the bank has made to detect unusual or suspicious transactions.

62. Supervisors have a duty not only to ensure their banks maintain high KYC standards to protect their own safety and soundness but also to protect the integrity of their national banking system. Supervisors should make it clear that they will take appropriate action, which may be severe and public if the circumstances warrant, against banks and their officers who demonstrably fail to follow their own internal procedures and regulatory requirements. In addition, supervisors should ensure that banks are aware of and pay particular attention to transactions that involve jurisdictions where standards are considered inadequate. The FATF and some national authorities have listed a number of countries and jurisdictions that are considered to have legal and administrative arrangements that do not comply with international standards for combating money laundering. Such findings should be a component of a bank's KYC policies and procedures.

V. Implementation of KYC standards in a cross-border context

63. Supervisors around the world should seek, to the best of their efforts, to develop and implement their national KYC standards fully in line with international standards so as to avoid potential regulatory arbitrage and safeguard the integrity of domestic and international banking systems. The implementation and assessment of such standards put to the test the willingness of supervisors to cooperate with each other in a very practical way, as well as the ability of banks to control risks on a groupwide basis. This is a challenging task for banks and supervisors alike.

64. Supervisors expect banking groups to apply an accepted minimum standard of KYC policies and procedures to both their local and overseas operations. The supervision of international banking can only be effectively carried out on a consolidated basis, and reputational risk as well as other banking risks are not limited to national boundaries. Parent banks must communicate their policies and procedures to their overseas branches and subsidiaries, including non-banking entities such as trust companies, and have a routine for testing compliance against both home and host country KYC standards in order for their programmes to operate effectively globally. Such compliance tests will also be tested by external auditors and supervisors. Therefore, it is important that KYC documentation is properly filed and available for their inspection. As far as compliance checks are concerned, supervisors and external auditors should in most cases examine systems and controls and look at customer accounts and transactions monitoring as part of a sampling process.

65. However small an overseas establishment is, a senior officer should be designated to be directly responsible for ensuring that all relevant staff are trained in, and observe, KYC procedures that meet both home and host standards. While this officer will bear primary responsibility, he should be supported by internal auditors and compliance officers from both local and head offices as appropriate.

66. Where the minimum KYC standards of the home and host countries differ, branches and subsidiaries in the host jurisdictions should apply the higher standard of the two. In general, there should be no impediment to prevent a bank from adopting standards that are higher than the minima required locally. If, however, local laws and regulations (especially secrecy provisions) prohibit the implementation of home country KYC standards, where the latter are more stringent, host country supervisors should use their best endeavours to have the law and regulations changed. In the meantime, overseas branches and subsidiaries would have to comply with host country standards, but they should make sure the head office or parent bank and its home country supervisor are fully informed of the nature of the difference.

67. Criminal elements are likely to be drawn toward jurisdictions with such impediments. Hence, banks should be aware of the high reputational risk of conducting business in these jurisdictions. Parent banks should have a procedure for reviewing the vulnerability of the individual operating units and implement additional safeguards where appropriate.
In extreme cases, supervisors should consider placing additional controls on banks operating in those jurisdictions and ultimately perhaps encouraging their withdrawal.

68. During on-site inspections, home country supervisors or auditors should face no impediments in verifying the unit’s compliance with KYC policies and procedures. This will require a review of customer files and some random sampling of accounts. Home country supervisors should have access to information on sampled individual customer accounts to the extent necessary to enable a proper evaluation of the application of KYC standards and an assessment of risk management practices, and should not be impeded by local bank secrecy laws. Where the home country supervisor requires consolidated reporting of deposit or borrower concentrations or notification of funds under management, there should be no impediments. In addition, with a view to monitoring deposit concentrations or the funding risk of the deposit being withdrawn, home supervisors may apply materiality tests and establish some thresholds so that if a customer’s deposit exceeds a certain percentage of the balance sheet, banks should report it to the home supervisor. However, safeguards are needed to ensure that information regarding individual accounts is used exclusively for lawful supervisory purposes, and can be protected by the recipient in a satisfactory manner. A statement of mutual cooperation to facilitate information sharing between the two supervisors would be helpful in this regard.

69. In certain cases there may be a serious conflict between the KYC policies of a parent bank imposed by its home authority and what is permitted in a cross-border office. There may, for example, be local laws that prevent inspections by the parent banks’ compliance officers, internal auditors or home country supervisors, or that enable bank customers to use fictitious names or to hide behind agents or intermediaries that are forbidden from revealing who their clients are. In such cases, the home supervisor should communicate with the host supervisor in order to confirm whether there are indeed genuine legal impediments and whether they apply extraterritorially. If they prove to be insurmountable, and there are no satisfactory alternative arrangements, the home supervisor should make it clear to the host that the bank may decide for itself, or be required by its home supervisor, to close down the operation in question. In the final analysis, any arrangements underpinning such on-site examinations should provide a mechanism that permits an assessment that is satisfactory to the home supervisor. Statements of cooperation or memoranda of understanding setting out the mechanics of the arrangements may be helpful. Access to information by home country supervisors should be as unrestricted as possible, and at a minimum they should have free access to the banks' general policies and procedures for customer due diligence and for dealing with suspicions.

Excerpts from Core Principles Methodology

Principle 15: Banking supervisors must determine that banks have adequate policies, practices and procedures in place, including strict “know-your-customer” rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor determines that banks have in place adequate policies, practices and procedures that promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements. This includes the prevention and detection of criminal activity or fraud, and reporting of such suspected activities to the appropriate authorities.

2. The supervisor determines that banks have documented and enforced policies for identification of customers and those acting on their behalf as part of their anti-money-laundering program. There are clear rules on what records must be kept on customer identification and individual transactions and the retention period.

3. The supervisor determines that banks have formal procedures to recognise potentially suspicious transactions. These might include additional authorisation for large cash (or similar) deposits or withdrawals and special procedures for unusual transactions.

4. The supervisor determines that banks appoint a senior officer with explicit responsibility for ensuring that the bank's policies and procedures are, at a minimum, in accordance with local statutory and regulatory anti-money laundering requirements.

5. The supervisor determines that banks have clear procedures, communicated to all personnel, for staff to report suspicious transactions to the dedicated senior officer responsible for anti-money laundering compliance.

6. The supervisor determines that banks have established lines of communication both to management and to an internal security (guardian) function for reporting problems.

7. In addition to reporting to the appropriate criminal authorities, banks report to the supervisor suspicious activities and incidents of fraud material to the safety, soundness or reputation of the bank.
8. Laws, regulations and/or banks’ policies ensure that a member of staff who reports suspicious transactions in good faith to the dedicated senior officer, internal security function, or directly to the relevant authority cannot be held liable.

9. The supervisor periodically checks that banks’ money laundering controls and their systems for preventing, identifying and reporting fraud are sufficient. The supervisor has adequate enforcement powers (regulatory and/or criminal prosecution) to take action against a bank that does not comply with its anti-money laundering obligations.

10. The supervisor is able, directly or indirectly, to share with domestic and foreign financial sector supervisory authorities information related to suspected or actual criminal activities.

11. The supervisor determines that banks have a policy statement on ethics and professional behaviour that is clearly communicated to all staff.

Additional criteria
1. The laws and/or regulations embody international sound practices, such as compliance with the relevant forty Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 1990 (revised 1996).
2. The supervisor determines that bank staff is adequately trained on money laundering detection and prevention.
3. The supervisor has the legal obligation to inform the relevant criminal authorities of any suspicious transactions.
4. The supervisor is able, directly or indirectly, to share with relevant judicial authorities information related to suspected or actual criminal activities.
5. If not performed by another agency, the supervisor has in-house resources with specialist expertise on financial fraud and anti-money laundering obligations.

7.1.3 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 7 - Measures to combat money-laundering
1. Each State Party:
   (a) Shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions;

3. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering.

7.1.4 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 14 - Measures to prevent money-laundering
1. Each State Party shall:
   (a) Institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including natural or legal persons that provide formal or informal services for the transmission of money or value and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer and, where appropriate, beneficial owner identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions;

4. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering.


Article 10
Member States shall ensure that if, in the course of inspections carried out in the institutions and persons subject to this Directive by the competent authorities, or in any other way, those authorities discover facts that could constitute evidence of money laundering, they inform the authorities responsible for combating money laundering.

Member States shall ensure that supervisory bodies empowered by law or regulation to oversee the stock, foreign exchange and financial derivatives markets inform the authorities responsible for combating money laundering if they discover facts that could constitute evidence of money laundering.
8 DEFINITIONS – PENAL

8.1.1 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Article 1
(f) "Confiscation", which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority;
(l) "Freezing" or "seizure" means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or a competent authority;
(p) "Proceeds" means any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1;
(q) "Property" means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets;

8.1.2 1990 CoE Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime

Article 1
For the purposes of this Convention:
a “proceeds” means any economic advantage from criminal offences. It may consist of any property as defined sub-paragraph b of this article;
b “property” includes property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in such property;
c “instrumentalities” means any property used or intended to be used, in any manner, wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences;
d “confiscation” means a penalty or a measure, ordered by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or criminal offences resulting in the final deprivation of property;
e “predicate offence” means any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in Article 6 of this Convention.

8.1.3 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 2 - Use of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;
(b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty;
(c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure;
(d) “Property” shall mean assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets;
(e) “Proceeds of crime” shall mean any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence;
(f) “Freezing” or “seizure” shall mean temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority;
(g) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, shall mean the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority;
(h) “Predicate offence” shall mean any offence as a result of which proceeds have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in article 6 of this Convention;
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8.1.4 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 2- Use of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
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(d) “Property” shall mean assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such assets;
(e) “Proceeds of crime” shall mean any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence;
(f) “Freezing” or “seizure” shall mean temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority;
(g) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, shall mean the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority;
(h) “Predicate offence” shall mean any offence as a result of which proceeds have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in article 23 of this Convention;
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9 MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES

9.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 1

Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may be described by reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach), or to a list of predicate offences, or a combination of these approaches.

Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a minimum comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious offences under their national law or should include offences which are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment or for those countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, predicate offences should comprise all offences, which are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months imprisonment.

Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of offences.

Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in another country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide that the only prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically.

Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to persons who committed the predicate offence, where this is required by fundamental principles of their domestic law.

Recommendation 2
Countries should ensure that:

a) The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of money laundering is consistent with the standards set forth in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, including the concept that such mental state may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

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The Glossary
“Designated categories of offences” means:
- participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering;
- terrorism, including terrorist financing;
- trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling;
- sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children;
- illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
- illicit arms trafficking;
- illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;
- corruption and bribery;
- fraud;
- counterfeiting currency;
- counterfeiting and piracy of products;
- environmental crime;
- murder, grievous bodily injury;
- kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking;
- robbery or theft;
- smuggling;
- extortion;
- forgery;
- piracy; and
- insider trading and market manipulation.

When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences under each of the categories listed above, each country may decide, in accordance with its domestic law, how it will define those offences and the nature of any particular elements of those offences that make them serious offences.
9.1.2 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

**Article 3**

1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally:
   (a) (i) The production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention;
   (ii) The cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention and the 1961 Convention as amended;
   (iii) The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in (i) above;
   (iv) The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or of substances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;
   (v) The organization, management or financing of any of the offences enumerated in (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above;
   (b) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions;
   (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence or offences;
   (c) Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system:
      (i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences established in accordance in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such offence or offences;
      (ii) The possession of equipment or materials or substances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;
      (iii) Publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the offences established in accordance with this article or to use narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances illicitly;
      (iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.

2. Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.

3. Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

4. (a) Each Party shall make the commission of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article liable to sanctions which take into account the grave nature of these offences, such as imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation.
   (b) The Parties may provide, in addition to conviction or punishment, for an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, that the offender shall undergo measures such as treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration.
   (c) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraphs, in appropriate cases of a minor nature, the Parties may provide, as alternatives to conviction or punishment, measures such as education, rehabilitation or social reintegration, as well as, when the offender is a drug abuser, treatment and aftercare.
   (d) The Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment, or in addition to conviction or punishment of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, measures for the treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration of the offender.

5. The Parties shall ensure that their courts and other competent authorities having jurisdiction can take into account factual circumstances which make the commission of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article particularly serious, such as:
   (a) The involvement in the offence of an organized criminal group to which the offender belongs;
   (b) The involvement of the offender in other international organized criminal activities;
   (c) The involvement of the offender in other illegal activities facilitated by commission of the offence;
   (d) The use of violence or arms by the offender;
   (e) The fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offence is connected with the office in question;
   (f) The victimization or use of minors;
(g) The fact that the offence is committed in a penal institution or in an educational institution or social service facility or in their immediate vicinity or in other places to which school children and students resort for educational, sports and social activities;
(h) Prior conviction, particularly for similar offences, whether foreign or domestic, to the extent permitted under the domestic law of a Party.

6. The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under their domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established in accordance with this article are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences.

7. The Parties shall ensure that their courts or other competent authorities bear in mind the serious nature of the offences enumerated in paragraph 1 of this article and the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 5 of this article when considering the eventuality of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences.

8. Each Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, and a longer period where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice.

9. Each Party shall take appropriate measures, consistent with its legal system, to ensure that a person charged with or convicted of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, is present at the necessary criminal proceedings.

10. For the purpose of co-operation among the Parties under this Convention, including, in particular, co-operation under articles 5, 6, 7 and 9, offences established in accordance with this article shall not be considered as fiscal offences or as political offences or regarded as politically motivated, without prejudice to the constitutional limitations and the fundamental domestic law of the Parties.

11. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the description of the offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is reserved to the domestic law of a Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in conformity with that law.

9.1.3 1990 CoE Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime

**Article 6 – Laundering offences**

1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally:
   a the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his actions;
   b the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is proceeds;
   c the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was proceeds;
   d participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.

2 For the purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:
   a it shall not matter whether the predicate offence was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Party;
   b it may be provided that the offences set forth in that paragraph do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence;
   c knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in that paragraph may be inferred from objective, factual circumstances.

3 Each Party may adopt such measures as it considers necessary to establish also as offences under its domestic law all or some of the acts referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, in any or all of the following cases where the offender:
   a ought to have assumed that the property was proceeds;
   b acted for the purpose of making profit;
   c acted for the purpose of promoting the carrying on of further criminal activity.

4 Each Party may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe declare that paragraph 1 of this article applies only to predicate offences or categories of such offences specified in such declaration.
Article 6 - Criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime
1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
   (a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action;
   (ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.
2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:
   (a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the widest range of predicate offences;
   (b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences all serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention and the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 8 and 23 of this Convention. In the case of States Parties whose legislation sets out a list of specific predicate offences, they shall, at a minimum, include in such list a comprehensive range of offences associated with organized criminal groups;
   (c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b), predicate offences shall include offences committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question. However, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed and would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article had it been committed there;
   (d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
   (e) If required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State Party, it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence;
   (f) Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

Article 23 - Laundering of proceeds of crime
1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
   (a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action;
   (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime;
   (b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:
      (i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime;
      (ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.
2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:
   (a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the widest range of predicate offences;
   (b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences at a minimum a comprehensive range of criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention;
   (c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b) above, predicate offences shall include offences committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question. However, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed and would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article had it been committed there;
   (d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
   (e) If required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State Party, it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence.
**Article 24 - Concealment**
Without prejudice to the provisions of article 23 of this Convention, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally after the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this Convention without having participated in such offences, the concealment or continued retention of property when the person involved knows that such property is the result of any of the offences established in accordance with this Convention.

**Article 27 - Participation and attempt**
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic law, participation in any capacity such as an accomplice, assistant or instigator in an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic law, any attempt to commit an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
3. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic law, the preparation for an offence established in accordance with this Convention.

**Article 28 - Knowledge, intent and purpose as elements of an offence**
Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence established in accordance with this Convention may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

9.1.6 **Council of the EU Framework Decision on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime**

**Article 2 - Penalties**
Each Member State shall take the necessary steps consistent with its system of penalties to ensure that the offences referred to in Article 6(1)(a) and (b) of the 1990 Convention, as they result from the Article 1(b) of this framework Decision, are punishable by deprivation of liberty for a maximum of not less than 4 years.
10 PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND CONFISCATION

10.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 3
Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, including legislative measures, to enable their competent authorities to confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value, without prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties.

Such measures should include the authority to: (a) identify, trace and evaluate property which is subject to confiscation; (b) carry out provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such property; (c) take steps that will prevent or void actions that prejudice the State’s ability to recover property that is subject to confiscation; and (d) take any appropriate investigative measures.

Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law.

10.1.2 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Article 5
1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:
   (a) Proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds;
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2. Each Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
3. In order to carry out the measures referred to in this article, each Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. A Party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy.
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6. (a) If proceeds have been transformed or converted into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds.
   (b) If proceeds have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to seizure or freezing, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds.
   (c) Income or other benefits derived from:
      (i) Proceeds;
      (ii) Property into which proceeds have been transformed or converted; or
      (iii) Property with which proceeds have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds.
7. Each Party may consider ensuring that the onus of proof be reversed regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such action is consistent with the principles of its domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and other proceedings.
8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed as prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties.
9. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a Party.

10.1.3 1990 CoE Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime

Article 2 – Confiscation measures
1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds.
2. Each Party may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that paragraph 1 of this article applies only to offences or categories of offences specified in such declaration.
Article 3 – Investigative and provisional measures
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to identify and trace property which is liable to confiscation pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1, and to prevent any dealing in, transfer or disposal of such property.

Article 4 – Special investigative powers and techniques
1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized in order to carry out the actions referred to in Articles 2 and 3. A Party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this article on grounds of bank secrecy.

Article 5 – Legal remedies
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that interested parties affected by measures under Articles 2 and 3 shall have effective legal remedies in order to preserve their rights.

10.1.4 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 12 - Confiscation and seizure
1. States Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:
(a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences covered by this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds;
(b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences covered by this Convention.
2. States Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
3. If proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds.
4. If proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds.
5. Income or other benefits derived from proceeds of crime, from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds of crime.
6. The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties.
7. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and other proceedings.
8. States Parties shall not decline to act under the provisions of this article on grounds of bank secrecy.
9. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a State Party.

10.1.5 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 31- Freezing, seizure and confiscation
1. Each State Party shall take, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:
(a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established in accordance with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds;
(b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
3. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to regulate the administration by the competent authorities of frozen, seized or confiscated property covered in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.
4. If such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds.

5. If such proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds.

6. Income or other benefits derived from such proceeds of crime, from property into which such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which such proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds of crime.

7. For the purpose of this article and article 55 of this Convention, each State Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or seized. A State Party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy.

8. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of such alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the fundamental principles of their domestic law and with the nature of judicial and other proceedings.

9. The provisions of this article shall not be so construed as to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties.

10. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a State Party.


Article 7
Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive refrain from carrying out transactions which they know or suspect to be related to money laundering until they have apprised the authorities referred to in Article 6. Those authorities may, under conditions determined by their national legislation, give instructions not to execute the operation. Where such a transaction is suspected of giving rise to money laundering and where to refrain in such manner is impossible or is likely to frustrate efforts to pursue the beneficiaries of a suspected money-laundering operation, the institutions and persons concerned shall apprise the authorities immediately afterwards.

10.1.7 Council of the EU Framework Decision on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime

Article 3 - Value confiscation
Each Member State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that its legislation and procedures on the confiscation of the proceeds of crime also allow, at least in cases where these proceeds cannot be seized, for the confiscation of property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds, both in purely domestic proceedings and in proceedings instituted at the request of another Member State, including requests for the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders. However, Member States may exclude the confiscation of property the value of which corresponds to the proceeds of crime in cases in which that value would be less than EUR 4000.

The words "property", "proceeds" and "confiscation" shall have the same meaning as in Article 1 of the 1990 Convention.
11 BEARER SHARES, TRUSTS AND CORPORATE LIABILITY

11.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 2
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b) Criminal liability, and, where that is not possible, civil or administrative liability, should apply to legal persons. This should not preclude parallel criminal, civil or administrative proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in which such forms of liability are available. Legal persons should be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. Such measures should be without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals.

Recommendation 33
Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal persons by money launderers. Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. In particular, countries that have legal persons that are able to issue bearer shares should take appropriate measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering and be able to demonstrate the adequacy of those measures. Countries could consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information to financial institutions undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendation 5.

The Glossary
“Legal persons” refers to bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt, partnerships, or associations, or any similar bodies that can establish a permanent customer relationship with a financial institution or otherwise own property.

Recommendation 34
Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal arrangements by money launderers. In particular, countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on express trusts, including information on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries, that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. Countries could consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information to financial institutions undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendation 5.

The Glossary
“Legal arrangements” refers to express trusts or other similar legal arrangements.

11.1.2 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 10 - Liability of legal persons
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal group and for the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention.
2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.
3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offences.
4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

11.1.3 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 26 - Liability of legal persons
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in the offences established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.
3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offences.
4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.
11.1.4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - Customer due diligence

2.2.1 Trust, nominee and fiduciary accounts
32. Trust, nominee and fiduciary accounts can be used to circumvent customer identification procedures. While it may be legitimate under certain circumstances to provide an extra layer of security to protect the confidentiality of legitimate private banking customers, it is essential that the true relationship is understood. Banks should establish whether the customer is taking the name of another customer, acting as a "front", or acting on behalf of another person as trustee, nominee or other intermediary. If so, a necessary precondition is receipt of satisfactory evidence of the identity of any intermediaries, and of the persons upon whose behalf they are acting, as well as details of the nature of the trust or other arrangements in place. Specifically, the identification of a trust should include the trustees, settlors/grantors and beneficiaries.

2.2.2 Corporate vehicles
33. Banks need to be vigilant in preventing corporate business entities from being used by natural persons as a method of operating anonymous accounts. Personal asset holding vehicles, such as international business companies, may make proper identification of customers or beneficial owners difficult. A bank should understand the structure of the company, determine the source of funds, and identify the beneficial owners and those who have control over the funds.

34. Special care needs to be exercised in initiating business transactions with companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form. Satisfactory evidence of the identity of beneficial owners of all such companies needs to be obtained. In the case of entities which have a significant proportion of capital in the form of bearer shares, extra vigilance is called for. A bank may be completely unaware that the bearer shares have changed hands. The onus is on banks to put in place satisfactory procedures to monitor the identity of material beneficial owners. This may require the bank to immobilise the shares, e.g. by holding the bearer shares in custody.

11.2 Shell companies

11.2.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 18
Countries should not approve the establishment or accept the continued operation of shell banks. Financial institutions should refuse to enter into, or continue, a correspondent banking relationship with shell banks. Financial institutions should also guard against establishing relations with respondent foreign financial institutions that permit their accounts to be used by shell banks.

The Glossary
“Shell bank” means a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial group.
12 NATIONAL CO-OPERATION

12.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 28
When conducting investigations of money laundering and underlying predicate offences, competent authorities should be able to obtain documents and information for use in those investigations, and in prosecutions and related actions. This should include powers to use compulsory measures for the production of records held by financial institutions and other persons, for the search of persons and premises, and for the seizure and obtaining of evidence.

Recommendation 30
Countries should provide their competent authorities involved in combating money laundering and terrorist financing with adequate financial, human and technical resources. Countries should have in place processes to ensure that the staff of those authorities are of high integrity.

Recommendation 31
Countries should ensure that policy makers, the FIU, law enforcement and supervisors have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to co-operate, and where appropriate coordinate domestically with each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Recommendation 32
Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can review the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing systems by maintaining comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of such systems. This should include statistics on the STR received and disseminated; on money laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions and convictions; on property frozen, seized and confiscated; and on mutual legal assistance or other international requests for co-operation.

12.1.2 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 7 - Measures to combat money-laundering
1. Each State Party:
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   (b) Shall, without prejudice to articles 18 and 27 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

12.1.3 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 14 - Measures to prevent money-laundering
1. Each State Party shall:
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   (b) Without prejudice to article 46 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

Article 37 - Cooperation with law enforcement authorities
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who have participated in the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention to supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, specific help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds.
2. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.

3. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.

4. Protection of such persons shall be, mutatis mutandis, as provided for in article 32 of this Convention.

5. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this article located in one State Party can provide substantial cooperation to the competent authorities of another State Party, the States Parties concerned may consider entering into agreements or arrangements, in accordance with their domestic law, concerning the potential provision by the other State Party of the treatment set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article.

Article 38 - Cooperation between national authorities
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its public officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. Such cooperation may include:
(a) Informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the offences established in accordance with articles 15, 21 and 23 of this Convention has been committed; or
(b) Providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary information.

Article 39 - Cooperation between national authorities and the private sector
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities and entities of the private sector, in particular financial institutions, relating to matters involving the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall consider encouraging its nationals and other persons with a habitual residence in its territory to report to the national investigating and prosecuting authorities the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.

Article 40 - Bank secrecy
Each State Party shall ensure that, in the case of domestic criminal investigations of offences established in accordance with this Convention, there are appropriate mechanisms available within its domestic legal system to overcome obstacles that may arise out of the application of bank secrecy laws.

Article 41 - Criminal record
Each State Party may adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to take into consideration, under such terms as and for the purpose that it deems appropriate, any previous conviction in another State of an alleged offender for the purpose of using such information in criminal proceedings relating to an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
13 INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

13.1 Mutual legal assistance – Law enforcement co-operation

13.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 36
Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest possible range of mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and related proceedings. In particular, countries should:

a) Not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on the provision of mutual legal assistance.
b) Ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the execution of mutual legal assistance requests.
c) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
d) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that laws require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality.

Countries should ensure that the powers of their competent authorities required under Recommendation 28 are also available for use in response to requests for mutual legal assistance, and if consistent with their domestic framework, in response to direct requests from foreign judicial or law enforcement authorities to domestic counterparts.

To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to devising and applying mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country.

Recommendation 37
Countries should, to the greatest extent possible, render mutual legal assistance notwithstanding the absence of dual criminality.

Where dual criminality is required for mutual legal assistance or extradition, that requirement should be deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both countries place the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that both countries criminalise the conduct underlying the offence.

Recommendation 40
Countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the widest possible range of international co-operation to their foreign counterparts. There should be clear and effective gateways to facilitate the prompt and constructive exchange directly between counterparts, either spontaneously or upon request, of information relating to both money laundering and the underlying predicate offences. Exchanges should be permitted without unduly restrictive conditions.

In particular:

a) Competent authorities should not refuse a request for assistance on the sole ground that the request is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
b) Countries should not invoke laws that require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality as a ground for refusing to provide co-operation.
c) Competent authorities should be able to conduct inquiries; and where possible, investigations; on behalf of foreign counterparts.

Where the ability to obtain information sought by a foreign competent authority is not within the mandate of its counterpart, countries are also encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of information with non-counterparts. Co-operation with foreign authorities other than counterparts could occur directly or indirectly. When uncertain about the appropriate avenue to follow, competent authorities should first contact their foreign counterparts for assistance.

Countries should establish controls and safeguards to ensure that information exchanged by competent authorities is used only in an authorised manner, consistent with their obligations concerning privacy and data protection.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 40

1. For the purposes of this Recommendation:
   • “Counterparts” refers to authorities that exercise similar responsibilities and functions.
   • “Competent authority” refers to all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors.

2. Depending on the type of competent authority involved and the nature and purpose of the cooperation, different channels can be appropriate for the exchange of information. Examples of mechanisms or channels that are used to exchange information include: bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements, memoranda of understanding,
exchanges on the basis of reciprocity, or through appropriate international or regional organisations. However, this Recommendation is not intended to cover co-operation in relation to mutual legal assistance or extradition.

3. The reference to indirect exchange of information with foreign authorities other than counterparts covers the situation where the requested information passes from the foreign authority through one or more domestic or foreign authorities before being received by the requesting authority. The competent authority that requests the information should always make it clear for what purpose and on whose behalf the request is made.

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13.1.2 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Article 7
1. The Parties shall afford one another, pursuant to this article, the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to criminal offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.
2. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may be requested for any of the following purposes:
   (a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
   (b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
   (c) Executing searches and seizures;
   (d) Examining objects and sites;
   (e) Providing information and evidentiary items;
   (f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records;
   (g) Identifying or tracing proceeds, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes.
3. The Parties may afford one another any other forms of mutual legal assistance allowed by the domestic law of the requested Party.
4. Upon request, the Parties shall facilitate or encourage, to the extent consistent with their domestic law and practice, the presence or availability of persons, including persons in custody, who consent to assist in investigations or participate in proceedings.
5. A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance under this article on the ground of bank secrecy.
6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
7. Paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to this article if the Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal assistance. If these Parties are bound by such a treaty, the corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless the Parties agree to apply paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article in lieu thereof.
8. Parties shall designate an authority, or when necessary authorities, which shall have the responsibility and power to execute requests for mutual legal assistance or to transmit them to the competent authorities for execution. The authority or the authorities designated for this purpose shall be notified to the Secretary-General. Transmission of requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication related thereto shall be effected between the authorities designated by the Parties; this requirement shall be without prejudice to the right of a Party to require that such requests and communications be addressed to it through the diplomatic channel and, in urgent circumstances, where the Parties agree, through channels of the International Criminal Police Organization, if possible.
9. Requests shall be made in writing in a language acceptable to the requested Party. The language or languages acceptable to each Party shall be notified to the Secretary-General. In urgent circumstances, and where agreed by the Parties, requests may be made orally, but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.
10. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain:
   (a) The identity of the authority making the request;
   (b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or proceeding to which the request relates, and the name and the functions of the authority conducting such investigation, prosecution or proceeding;
   (c) A summary of the relevant facts, except in respect of requests for the purpose of service of judicial documents;
   (d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular procedure the requesting Party wishes to be followed;
   (e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person concerned;
   (f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.
11. The requested Party may request additional information when it appears necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its domestic law or when it can facilitate such execution.
12. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the requested Party and where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.
13. The requesting Party shall not transmit nor use information or evidence furnished by the requested Party for investigations, prosecutions or proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested Party.

14. The requesting Party may require that the requested Party keep confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute the request. If the requested Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting Party.

15. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:
(a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this article;
(b) If the requested Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordure public or other essential interests;
(c) If the authorities of the requested Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or proceedings under their own jurisdiction;
(d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested Party relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.

16. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.

17. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested Party on the ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or proceeding. In such a case, the requested Party shall consult with the requesting Party to determine if the assistance can still be given subject to such terms and conditions as the requested Party deems necessary.

18. A witness, expert or other person who consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the requesting Party, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party. Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive days, or for any period agreed upon by the Parties, from the date on which he has been officially informed that his presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in the territory or, having left it, has returned of his own free will.

19. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested Party, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties concerned. If expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfill the request, the Parties shall consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the request will be executed as well as the manner in which the costs shall be borne.

20. The Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes of, give practical effect to, or enhance the provisions of this article.

13.1.3 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 7 - Measures to combat money-laundering
1. Each State Party:

   (b) Shall, without prejudice to articles 18 and 27 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

4. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional, subregional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.

Article 18 - Mutual legal assistance
1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by this Convention as provided for in article 3 and shall reciprocally extend to one another similar assistance where the requesting State Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), is transnational in nature, including that victims, witnesses, proceeds, instrumentalities or evidence of such offences are located in the requested State Party and that the offence involves an organized criminal group.

2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested State Party with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences for which a legal person may be held liable in accordance with article 10 of this Convention in the requesting State Party.
3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may be requested for any of the following purposes:
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
(c) Executing searches and seizures, and freezing;
(d) Examining objects and sites;
(e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records;
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes;
(h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting State Party;
(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party.

4. Without prejudice to domestic law, the competent authorities of a State Party may, without prior request, transmit information relating to criminal matters to a competent authority in another State Party where they believe that such information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully concluding inquiries and criminal proceedings or could result in a request formulated by the latter State Party pursuant to this Convention.

5. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article shall be without prejudice to inquiries and criminal proceedings in the State of the competent authorities providing the information. The competent authorities receiving the information shall comply with a request that said information remain confidential, even temporarily, or with restrictions on its use. However, this shall not prevent the receiving State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information that is exculpatory to an accused person. In such a case, the receiving State Party shall notify the transmitting State Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the transmitting State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the receiving State Party shall inform the transmitting State Party of the disclosure without delay.

6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal assistance.

7. Paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to this article if the States Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal assistance. If those States Parties are bound by such a treaty, the corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless the States Parties agree to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article in lieu thereof. States Parties are strongly encouraged to apply these paragraphs if they facilitate cooperation.

8. States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this article on the ground of bank secrecy.

9. States Parties may decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this article on the ground of absence of dual criminality. However, the requested State Party may, when it deems appropriate, provide assistance, to the extent it decides at its discretion, irrespective of whether the conduct would constitute an offence under the domestic law of the requested State Party.

10. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in relation to offences covered by this Convention may be transferred if the following conditions are met:
(a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent;
(b) The competent authorities of both States Parties agree, subject to such conditions as those States Parties may deem appropriate.

11. For the purposes of paragraph 10 of this article:
(a) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State Party from which the person was transferred;
(b) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State Party from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States Parties;
(c) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall not require the State Party from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person;
(d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in the custody of the State Party to which he or she was transferred.

12. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from which he or she was transferred.

13. Each State Party shall designate a central authority that shall have the responsibility and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and either to execute them or to transmit them to the competent authorities for execution. Where a State Party has a special region or territory with a separate system of mutual legal assistance, it may designate a distinct central authority that shall have the same function for that region or territory. Central authorities shall ensure
the speedy and proper execution or transmission of the requests received. Where the central authority transmits the request to a competent authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and proper execution of the request by the competent authority. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this purpose at the time each State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. Requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the central authorities designated by the States Parties. This requirement shall be without prejudice to the right of a State Party to require that such requests and communications be addressed to it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent circumstances, where the States Parties agree, through the International Criminal Police Organization, if possible.

14. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means capable of producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the requested State Party, under conditions allowing that State Party to establish authenticity. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the language or languages acceptable to each State Party at the time it deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. In urgent circumstances and where agreed by the States Parties, requests may be made orally, but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.

15. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain:
(a) The identity of the authority making the request;
(b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of the authority conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding;
(c) A summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for the purpose of service of judicial documents;
(d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular procedure that the requesting State Party wishes to be followed; 
(e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person concerned; and
(f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.

16. The requested State Party may request additional information when it appears necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its domestic law or when it can facilitate such execution.

17. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested State Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party and where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.

18. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, when an individual is in the territory of a State Party and has to be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State Party, the first State Party may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing to take place by video conference if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting State Party. States Parties may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a judicial authority of the requesting State Party and attended by a judicial authority of the requested State Party.

19. The requesting State Party shall not transmit or use information or evidence furnished by the requested State Party for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested State Party. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the requesting State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information or evidence that is exculpatory to an accused person. In the latter case, the requesting State Party shall notify the requested State Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the requested State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the requesting State Party shall inform the requested State Party of the disclosure without delay.

20. The requesting State Party may require that the requested State Party keep confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute the request. If the requested State Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting State Party.

21. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:
(a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this article;
(b) If the requested State Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests;
(c) If the authorities of the requested State Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial proceedings under their own jurisdiction;
(d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State Party relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.

22. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.

23. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.

24. The requested State Party shall execute the request for mutual legal assistance as soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any deadlines suggested by the requesting State Party and for which reasons are given, preferably in the request. The requested State Party shall respond to reasonable requests by the requesting State Party on progress of its handling of the request. The requesting State Party shall promptly inform the requested State Party when the assistance sought is no longer required.
25. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State Party on the ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding.
26. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 21 of this article or postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 25 of this article, the requested State Party shall consult with the requesting State Party to consider whether assistance may be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems necessary. If the requesting State Party accepts assistance subject to those conditions, it shall comply with the conditions.
27. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 12 of this article, a witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State Party, consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the requesting State Party shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the requested State Party. Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive days or for any period agreed upon by the States Parties from the date on which he or she has been officially informed that his or her presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in the territory of the requesting State Party or, having left it, has returned of his or her own free will.
28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested State Party, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties concerned. If expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfill the request, the States Parties shall consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the request will be executed, as well as the manner in which the costs shall be borne.
29. The requested State Party:
(a) Shall provide to the requesting State Party copies of government records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law are available to the general public;
(b) May, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State Party in whole, in part or subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of any government records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law are not available to the general public.
30. States Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this article.

**Article 27 - Law enforcement cooperation**

1. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this Convention. Each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective measures:
(a) To enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of communication between their competent authorities, agencies and services in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of the offences covered by this Convention, including, if the States Parties concerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal activities;
(b) To cooperate with other States Parties in conducting inquiries with respect to offences covered by this Convention concerning:
   (i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of involvement in such offences or the location of other persons concerned;
   (ii) The movement of proceeds of crime or property derived from the commission of such offences;
   (iii) The movement of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission of such offences;
(c) To provide, when appropriate, necessary items or quantities of substances for analytical or investigative purposes;
(d) To facilitate effective cooperation between their competent authorities, agencies and services and to promote the exchange of personnel and other experts, including, subject to bilateral agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the posting of liaison officers;
(e) To exchange information with other States Parties on specific means and methods used by organized criminal groups, including, where applicable, routes and conveyances and the use of false identities, altered or false documents or other means of concealing their activities;
(f) To exchange information and coordinate administrative and other measures taken as appropriate for the purpose of early identification of the offences covered by this Convention.
2. With a view to giving effect to this Convention, States Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on direct cooperation between their law enforcement agencies and, where such agreements or arrangements already exist, amending them. In the absence of such agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the Parties may consider this Convention as the basis for mutual law enforcement cooperation in respect of the offences covered by this Convention. Whenever appropriate, States Parties shall make full use of agreements or arrangements, including international or regional organizations, to enhance the cooperation between their law enforcement agencies.
3. States Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond to transnational organized crime committed through the use of modern technology.
Article 14 - Measures to prevent money-laundering
1. Each State Party shall:

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(b) Without prejudice to article 46 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

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5. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional, subregional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.

Article 46 - Mutual legal assistance
1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by this Convention.
2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested State Party with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences for which a legal person may be held liable in accordance with article 26 of this Convention in the requesting State Party.
3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may be requested for any of the following purposes:
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
(c) Executing searches and seizures, and freezing;
(d) Examining objects and sites;
(e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records;
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes;
(h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting State Party;
(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party;
(j) Identifying, freezing and tracing proceeds of crime in accordance with the provisions of chapter V of this Convention;
(k) The recovery of assets, in accordance with the provisions of chapter V of this Convention.
4. Without prejudice to domestic law, the competent authorities of a State Party may, without prior request, transmit information relating to criminal matters to a competent authority in another State Party where they believe that such information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully concluding inquiries and criminal proceedings or could result in a request formulated by the latter State Party pursuant to this Convention.
5. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article shall be without prejudice to inquiries and criminal proceedings in the State of the competent authorities providing the information. The competent authorities receiving the information shall comply with a request that said information remain confidential, even temporarily, or with restrictions on its use. However, this shall not prevent the receiving State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information that is exculpatory to an accused person. In such a case, the receiving State Party shall notify the transmitting State Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the transmitting State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the receiving State Party shall inform the transmitting State Party of the disclosure without delay.
6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal assistance.
7. Paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to this article if the States Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal assistance. If those States Parties are bound by such a treaty, the corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless the States Parties agree to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article in lieu thereof. States Parties are strongly encouraged to apply those paragraphs if they facilitate cooperation.
8. States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this article on the ground of bank secrecy.
9. (a) A requested State Party, in responding to a request for assistance pursuant to this article in the absence of dual criminality, shall take into account the purposes of this Convention, as set forth in article 1;
(b) States Parties may decline to render assistance pursuant to this article on the ground of absence of dual criminality. However, a requested State Party shall, where consistent with the basic concepts of its legal system, render assistance that does not involve coercive action. Such assistance may be refused when requests involve matters of a de minimis nature or matters for which the cooperation or assistance sought is available under other provisions of this Convention;
(c) Each State Party may consider adopting such measures as may be necessary to enable it to provide a wider scope of assistance pursuant to this article in the absence of dual criminality.

10. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in relation to offences covered by this Convention may be transferred if the following conditions are met:

(a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent;
(b) The competent authorities of both States Parties agree, subject to such conditions as those States Parties may deem appropriate.

11. For the purposes of paragraph 10 of this article:

(a) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State Party from which the person was transferred;
(b) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State Party from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States Parties;
(c) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall not require the State Party from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person;
(d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in the custody of the State Party to which he or she was transferred.

12. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from which he or she was transferred.

13. Each State Party shall designate a central authority that shall have the responsibility and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and either to execute them or to transmit them to the competent authorities for execution. Where a State Party has a special region or territory with a separate system of mutual legal assistance, it may designate a distinct central authority that shall have the same function for that region or territory. Central authorities shall ensure the speedy and proper execution or transmission of the requests received. Where the central authority transmits the request to a competent authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and proper execution of the request by the competent authority. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this purpose at the time each State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. Requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the central authorities designated by the States Parties. This requirement shall be without prejudice to the right of a State Party to require that such requests and communications be addressed to it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent circumstances, where the States Parties agree, through the International Criminal Police Organization, if possible.

14. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means capable of producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the requested State Party, under conditions allowing that State Party to establish authenticity. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the language or languages acceptable to each State Party at the time it deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. In urgent circumstances and where agreed by the States Parties, requests may be made orally but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.

15. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain:

(a) The identity of the authority making the request;
(b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of the authority conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding;
(c) A summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for the purpose of service of judicial documents;
(d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular procedure that the requesting State Party wishes to be followed;
(e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person concerned; and
(f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.

16. The requested State Party may request additional information when it appears necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its domestic law or when it can facilitate such execution.

17. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested State Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party and where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.

18. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, when an individual is in the territory of a State Party and has to be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State Party, the first State Party may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing to take place by video conference if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting State Party. States Parties
may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a judicial authority of the requesting State Party and attended by a judicial authority of the requested State Party.

19. The requesting State Party shall not transmit or use information or evidence furnished by the requested State Party for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested State Party. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the requesting State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information or evidence that is exculpatory to an accused person. In the latter case, the requesting State Party shall notify the requested State Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the requested State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the requesting State Party shall inform the requested State Party of the disclosure without delay.

20. The requesting State Party may require that the requested State Party keep confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute the request. If the requested State Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting State Party.

21. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:
   (a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this article;
   (b) If the requested State Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests;
   (c) If the authorities of the requested State Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial proceedings under their own jurisdiction;
   (d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State Party relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.

22. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.

23. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.

24. The requested State Party shall execute the request for mutual legal assistance as soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any deadlines suggested by the requesting State Party and for which reasons are given, preferably in the request. The requesting State Party may make reasonable requests for information on the status and progress of measures taken by the requested State Party to satisfy its request. The requested State Party shall respond to reasonable requests by the requesting State Party on the status, and progress in its handling, of the request. The requesting State Party shall promptly inform the requested State Party when the assistance sought is no longer required.

25. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State Party on the ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding.

26. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 21 of this article or postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 25 of this article, the requested State Party shall consult with the requesting State Party to consider whether assistance may be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems necessary. If the requesting State Party accepts assistance subject to those conditions, it shall comply with the conditions.

27. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 12 of this article, a witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State Party, consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the requesting State Party shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the requested State Party. Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive days or for any period agreed upon by the States Parties from the date on which he or she has been officially informed that his or her presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in the territory of the requesting State Party or, having left it, has returned of his or her own free will.

28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested State Party, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties concerned. If expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfil the request, the States Parties shall consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the request will be executed, as well as the manner in which the costs shall be borne.

29. The requested State Party:
   (a) Shall provide to the requesting State Party copies of government records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law are available to the general public;
   (b) May, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State Party in whole, in part or subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of any government records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law are not available to the general public.

30. States Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this article.

Article 47 - Transfer of criminal proceedings
States Parties shall consider the possibility of transferring to one another proceedings for the prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper administration of justice, in particular in cases where several jurisdictions are involved, with a view to concentrating the prosecution.
Article 48 - Law enforcement cooperation
1. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this Convention. States Parties shall, in particular, take effective measures:
(a) To enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of communication between their competent authorities, agencies and services in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of the offences covered by this Convention, including, if the States Parties concerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal activities;
(b) To cooperate with other States Parties in conducting inquiries with respect to offences covered by this Convention concerning:
(i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of involvement in such offences or the location of other persons concerned;
(ii) The movement of proceeds of crime or property derived from the commission of such offences;
(iii) The movement of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission of such offences;
(c) To provide, where appropriate, necessary items or quantities of substances for analytical or investigative purposes;
(d) To exchange, where appropriate, information with other States Parties concerning specific means and methods used to commit offences covered by this Convention, including the use of false identities, forged, altered or false documents and other means of concealing activities;
(e) To facilitate effective coordination between their competent authorities, agencies and services and to promote the exchange of personnel and other experts, including, subject to bilateral agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the posting of liaison officers;
(f) To exchange information and coordinate administrative and other measures taken as appropriate for the purpose of early identification of the offences covered by this Convention.
2. With a view to giving effect to this Convention, States Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on direct cooperation between their law enforcement agencies and, where such agreements or arrangements already exist, amending them. In the absence of such agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the States Parties may consider this Convention to be the basis for mutual law enforcement cooperation in respect of the offences covered by this Convention. Whenever appropriate, States Parties shall make full use of agreements or arrangements, including international or regional organizations, to enhance the cooperation between their law enforcement agencies.
3. States Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond to offences covered by this Convention committed through the use of modern technology.

13.1.5 The 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the EU

Article 3 - Proceedings in connection with which mutual assistance is also to be afforded
1. Mutual assistance shall also be afforded in proceedings brought by the administrative authorities in respect of acts which are punishable under the national law of the requesting or the requested Member State, or both, by virtue of being infringements of the rules of law, and where the decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters.
2. Mutual assistance shall also be afforded in connection with criminal proceedings and proceedings as referred to in paragraph 1 which relate to offences or infringements for which a legal person may be held liable in the requesting Member State.

Article 4 - Formalities and procedures in the execution of requests for mutual assistance
1. Where mutual assistance is afforded, the requested Member State shall comply with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the requesting Member State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention and provided that such formalities and procedures are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law in the requested Member State.
2. The requested Member State shall execute the request for assistance as soon as possible, taking as full account as possible of the procedural deadlines and other deadlines indicated by the requesting Member State. The requesting Member State shall explain the reasons for the deadline.
3. If the request cannot, or cannot fully, be executed in accordance with the requirements set by the requesting Member State, the authorities of the requested Member State shall promptly inform the authorities of the requesting Member State and indicate the conditions under which it might be possible to execute the request. The authorities of the requesting and the requested Member State may subsequently agree on further action to be taken concerning the request, where necessary by making such action subject to the fulfilment of those conditions.
4. If it is foreseeable that the deadline set by the requesting Member State for executing its request cannot be met, and if the reasons referred to in paragraph 2, second sentence, indicate explicitly that any delay will lead to substantial impairment of the proceedings being conducted in the requesting Member State, the authorities of the requested Member State shall promptly indicate the estimated time needed for execution of the request. The authorities of the
Article 5 - Sending and service of procedural documents
1. Each Member State shall send procedural documents intended for persons who are in the territory of another Member State to them directly by post.
2. Procedural documents may be sent via the competent authorities of the requested Member State only if:
   (a) the address of the person for whom the document is intended is unknown or uncertain; or
   (b) the relevant procedural law of the requesting Member State requires proof of service of the document on the addressee, other than proof that can be obtained by post; or
   (c) it has not been possible to serve the document by post; or
   (d) the requesting Member State has justified reasons for considering that dispatch by post will be ineffective or is inappropriate.
3. Where there is reason to believe that the addressee does not understand the language in which the document is drawn up, the document, or at least the important passages thereof, must be translated into (one of) the language(s) of the Member State in the territory of which the addressee is staying. If the authority by which the procedural document was issued knows that the addressee understands only some other language, the document, or at least the important passages thereof, must be translated into that other language.
4. All procedural documents shall be accompanied by a report stating that the addressee may obtain information from the authority by which the document was issued or from other authorities in that Member State regarding his or her rights and obligations concerning the document. Paragraph 3 shall also apply to that report.
5. This Article shall not affect the application of Articles 8, 9 and 12 of the European Mutual Assistance Convention and Articles 32, 34 and 35 of the Benelux Treaty.

Article 6 - Transmission of requests for mutual assistance
1. Requests for mutual assistance and spontaneous exchanges of information referred to in Article 7 shall be made in writing, or by any means capable of producing a written record under conditions allowing the receiving Member State to establish authenticity. Such requests shall be made directly between judicial authorities with territorial competence for initiating and executing them, and shall be returned through the same channels unless otherwise specified in this Article.
Any information laid by a Member State with a view to proceedings before the courts of another Member State within the meaning of Article 21 of the European Mutual Assistance Convention and Article 42 of the Benelux Treaty may be the subject of direct communications between the competent judicial authorities.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prejudice the possibility of requests being sent or returned in specific cases:
   (a) between a central authority of a Member State and a central authority of another Member State; or
   (b) between a judicial authority of one Member State and a central authority of another Member State.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the United Kingdom and Ireland, respectively, may, when giving the notification provided for in Article 27(2), declare that requests and communications to it, as specified in the declaration, must be sent via its central authority. These Member States may at any time by a further declaration limit the scope of such a declaration for the purpose of giving greater effect to paragraph 1. They shall do so when the provisions on mutual assistance of the Schengen Implementation Convention are put into effect for them. Any Member State may apply the principle of reciprocity in relation to the declarations referred to above.
4. Any request for mutual assistance may, in case of urgency, be made via the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) or any body competent under provisions adopted pursuant to the Treaty on European Union.
5. Where, in respect of requests pursuant to Articles 12, 13 or 14, the competent authority is a judicial authority or a central authority in one Member State and a police or customs authority in the other Member State, requests may be made and answered directly between these authorities. Paragraph 4 shall apply to these contacts.
6. Where, in respect of requests for mutual assistance in relation to proceedings as envisaged in Article 3(1), the competent authority is a judicial authority or a central authority in one Member State and an administrative authority in the other Member State, requests may be made and answered directly between these authorities.
7. Any Member State may declare, when giving the notification provided for in Article 27(2), that it is not bound by the first sentence of paragraph 5 or by paragraph 6 of this Article, or both or that it will apply those provisions only under certain conditions which it shall specify. Such a declaration may be withdrawn or amended at any time.
8. The following requests or communications shall be made through the central authorities of the Member States:
   (a) requests for temporary transfer or transit of persons held in custody as referred to in Article 9 of this Convention, in Article 11 of the European Mutual Assistance Convention and in Article 33 of the Benelux Treaty;
   (b) notices of information from judicial records as referred to in Article 22 of the European Mutual Assistance Convention and Article 43 of the Benelux Treaty. However, requests for copies of convictions and measures as referred to in Article 4 of the Additional Protocol to the European Mutual Assistance Convention may be made directly to the competent authorities.
Article 7 - Spontaneous exchange of information
1. Within the limits of their national law, the competent authorities of the Member States may exchange information, without a request to that effect, relating to criminal offences and the infringements of rules of law referred to in Article 3(1), the punishment or handling of which falls within the competence of the receiving authority at the time the information is provided.
2. The providing authority may, pursuant to its national law, impose conditions on the use of such information by the receiving authority.
3. The receiving authority shall be bound by those conditions.

13.1.6 Council of the EU Framework Decision on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime

Article 4 - Processing of requests for mutual assistance
Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that all requests from other Member States which relate to asset identification, tracing, freezing or seizing and confiscation are processed with the same priority as is given to such measures in domestic proceedings.

13.1.7 The protocol to the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the EU

Article 1 - Request for information on bank accounts
1. Each Member State shall, under the conditions set out in this Article, take the measures necessary to determine, in answer to a request sent by another Member State, whether a natural or legal person that is the subject of a criminal investigation holds or controls one or more accounts, of whatever nature, in any bank located in its territory and, if so, provide all the details of the identified accounts.

   The information shall also, if requested and to the extent that it can be provided within a reasonable time, include accounts for which the person that is the subject of the proceedings has powers of attorney.

2. The obligation set out in this Article shall apply only to the extent that the information is in the possession of the bank keeping the account.
3. The obligation set out in this Article shall apply only if the investigation concerns
   - an offence punishable by a penalty involving deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum period of at least four years in the requesting State and at least two years in the requested State, or
   - an offence referred to in Article 2 of the 1995 Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), or in the Annex to that Convention, as amended, or
   - to the extent that it may not be covered by the Europol Convention, an offence referred to in the 1995 Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, the 1996 Protocol thereto, or the 1997 Second Protocol thereto.
4. The authority making the request shall, in the request:
   - state why it considers that the requested information is likely to be of substantial value for the purpose of the investigation into the offence;
   - state on what grounds it presumes that banks in the requested Member State hold the account and, to the extent available, which banks may be involved;
   - include any information available which may facilitate the execution of the request.
5. Member States may make the execution of a request according to this Article dependent on the same conditions as they apply in respect of requests for search and seizure.
6. The Council may decide, pursuant to Article 34(2)(c) of the Treaty of European Union, to extend the scope of paragraph 3.

Article 2 - Requests for information on banking transactions
1. On request by the requesting State, the requested State shall provide the particulars of specified bank accounts and of banking operations which have been carried out during a specified period through one or more accounts specified in the request, including the particulars of any sending or recipient account.
2. The obligation set out in this Article shall apply only to the extent that the information is in the possession of the bank holding the account.
3. The requesting Member State shall in its request indicate why it considers the requested information relevant for the purpose of the investigation into the offence.
4. Member States may make the execution of a request according to this Article dependent on the same conditions as they apply in respect of requests for search and seizure.
Article 3 - Requests for the monitoring of banking transactions
1. Each Member State shall undertake to ensure that, at the request of another Member State, it is able to monitor, during a specified period, the banking operations that are being carried out through one or more accounts specified in the request and communicate the results thereof to the requesting Member State.
2. The requesting Member State shall in its request indicate why it considers the requested information relevant for the purpose of the investigation into the offence.
3. The decision to monitor shall be taken in each individual case by the competent authorities of the requested Member State, with due regard for the national law of that Member State.
4. The practical details regarding the monitoring shall be agreed between the competent authorities of the requesting and requested Member States.

Article 4 - Confidentiality
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that banks do not disclose to the bank customer concerned or to other third persons that information has been transmitted to the requesting State in accordance with Articles 1, 2 or 3 or that an investigation is being carried out.

Article 5 - Obligation to inform
If the competent authority of the requested Member State in the course of the execution of a request for mutual assistance considers that it may be appropriate to undertake investigations not initially foreseen, or which could not be specified when the request was made, it shall immediately inform the requesting authority accordingly in order to enable it to take further action.

Article 6 - Additional requests for mutual assistance
1. Where the competent authority of the requesting Member State makes a request for mutual assistance which is additional to an earlier request, it shall not be required to provide information already provided in the initial request. The additional request shall contain information necessary for the purpose of identifying the initial request.
2. Where, in accordance with the provisions in force, the competent authority which has made a request for mutual assistance participates in the execution of the request in the requested Member State, it may, without prejudice to Article 6(3) of the 2000 Mutual Assistance Convention, make an additional request directly to the competent authority of the requested Member State while present in that State.

Article 7 - Banking secrecy
A Member State shall not invoke banking secrecy as a reason for refusing any cooperation regarding a request for mutual assistance from another Member State.

Article 8 - Fiscal offences
1. Mutual assistance may not be refused solely on the ground that the request concerns an offence which the requested Member State considers a fiscal offence.
2. If a Member State has made the execution of a request for search and seizure dependent on the condition that the offence giving rise to the request is also punishable under its law, this condition shall be fulfilled, with regard to offences referred to in paragraph 1, if the offence corresponds to an offence of the same nature under its law. The request may not be refused on the ground that the law of the requested Member State does not impose the same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, duty, customs and exchange regulation of the same kind as the law of the requesting Member State.
3. Article 50 of the Schengen Implementation Convention is hereby repealed.

Article 9 - Political offences
1. For the purposes of mutual legal assistance between Member States, no offence may be regarded by the requested Member State as a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.
2. Each Member State may, when giving the notification referred to in Article 13(2), declare that it will apply paragraph 1 only in relation to
   (a) the offences referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1977; and
   (b) offences of conspiracy or association - which correspond to the description of behaviour referred to in Article 3(4) of the Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union - to commit one or more of the offences referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.
3. Reservations made pursuant to Article 13 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism shall not apply to mutual legal assistance between Member States.
13.2 Asset recovery

13.2.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 38
There should be authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value. There should also be arrangements for co-ordinating seizure and confiscation proceedings, which may include the sharing of confiscated assets.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 38
Countries should consider:
a) Establishing an asset forfeiture fund in its respective country into which all or a portion of confiscated property will be deposited for law enforcement, health, education, or other appropriate purposes.
b) Taking such measures as may be necessary to enable it to share among or between other countries confiscated property, in particular, when confiscation is directly or indirectly a result of co-ordinated law enforcement actions.

13.2.2 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Article 5
4. (a) Following a request made pursuant to this article by another Party having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, the Party in whose territory proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are situated shall:
   (i) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such order is granted, give effect to it; or
   (ii) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, in so far as it relates to proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 situated in the territory of the requested Party.
(b) Following a request made pursuant to this article by another Party having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, the requested Party shall take measures to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by the requesting Party or, pursuant to a request under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, by the requested Party.
(c) The decisions or actions provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be taken by the requested Party, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or multilateral treaty, agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in relation to the requesting Party.
(d) The provisions of article 7, paragraphs 6 to 19 are applicable mutatis mutandis. In addition to the information specified in article 7, paragraph 10, requests made pursuant to this article shall contain the following:
   (i) In the case of a request pertaining to subparagraph (a)(i) of this paragraph, a description of the property to be confiscated and a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting Party sufficient to enable the requested Party to seek the order under its domestic law;
   (ii) In the case of a request pertaining to subparagraph (a)(ii), a legally admissible copy of an order of confiscation issued by the requesting Party upon which the request is based, a statement of the facts and information as to the extent to which the execution of the order is requested;
   (iii) In the case of a request pertaining to subparagraph (b), a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting Party and a description of the actions requested.
(e) Each Party shall furnish to the Secretary-General the text of any of its laws and regulations which give effect to this paragraph and the text of any subsequent changes to such laws and regulations.
(f) If a Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph conditional on the existence of a relevant treaty, that Party shall consider this Convention as the necessary and sufficient treaty basis.
(g) The Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties, agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international co-operation pursuant to this article.
5. (a) Proceeds or property confiscated by a Party pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 4 of this article shall be disposed of by that Party according to its domestic law and administrative procedures.
(b) When acting on the request of another Party in accordance with this article, a Party may give special consideration to concluding agreements on:
(i) Contributing the value of such proceeds and property, or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds or property, or a substantial part thereof, to intergovernmental bodies specializing in the fight against illicit traffic in and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
(ii) Sharing with other Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds or property, or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds or property, in accordance with its domestic law, administrative procedures or bilateral or multilateral agreements entered into for this purpose.

13.2.3 1990 CoE Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime

Article 7 – General principles and measures for international co-operation
1 The Parties shall co-operate with each other to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations and proceedings aiming at the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds.
2 Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to enable it to comply, under the conditions provided for in this chapter, with requests:
   a for confiscation of specific items of property representing proceeds or instrumentalities, as well as for confiscation of proceeds consisting in a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds;
   b for investigative assistance and provisional measures with a view to either form of confiscation referred to under a above.

Article 8 – Obligation to assist
The Parties shall afford each other, upon request, the widest possible measure of assistance in the identification and tracing of instrumentalities, proceeds and other property liable to confiscation. Such assistance shall include any measure providing and securing evidence as to the existence, location or movement, nature, legal status or value of the aforementioned property.

Article 9 – Execution of assistance
The assistance pursuant to Article 8 shall be carried out as permitted by and in accordance with the domestic law of the requested Party and, to the extent not incompatible with such law, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.

Article 10 – Spontaneous information
Without prejudice to its own investigations or proceedings, a Party may without prior request forward to another Party information on instrumentalities and proceeds, when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings or might lead to a request by that Party under this chapter.

Article 11 – Obligation to take provisional measures
1 At the request of another Party which has instituted criminal proceedings or proceedings for the purpose of confiscation, a Party shall take the necessary provisional measures, such as freezing or seizing, to prevent any dealing in, transfer or disposal of property which, at a later stage, may be the subject of a request for confiscation or which might be such as to satisfy the request.
2 A Party which has received a request for confiscation pursuant to Article 13 shall, if so requested, take the measures mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article in respect of any property which is the subject of the request or which might be such as to satisfy the request.

Article 12 – Execution of provisional measures
1 The provisional measures mentioned in Article 11 shall be carried out as permitted by and in accordance with the domestic law of the requested Party and, to the extent not incompatible with such law, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.
2 Before lifting any provisional measure taken pursuant to this article, the requested Party shall, wherever possible, give the requesting Party an opportunity to present its reasons in favour of continuing the measure.

Article 13 – Obligation to confiscate
1 A Party, which has received a request made by another Party for confiscation concerning instrumentalities or proceeds, situated in its territory, shall:
   a enforce a confiscation order made by a court of a requesting Party in relation to such instrumentalities or proceeds; or
   b submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such order is granted, enforce it.
2 For the purposes of applying paragraph 1.b of this article, any Party shall whenever necessary have competence to institute confiscation proceedings under its own law.
The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to confiscation consisting in a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds, if property on which the confiscation can be enforced is located in the requested Party. In such cases, when enforcing confiscation pursuant to paragraph 1, the requested Party shall, if payment is not obtained, realise the claim on any property available for that purpose.

If a request for confiscation concerns a specific item of property, the Parties may agree that the requested Party may enforce the confiscation in the form of a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of the property.

**Article 14 – Execution of confiscation**

1. The procedures for obtaining and enforcing the confiscation under Article 13 shall be governed by the law of the requested Party.
2. The requested Party shall be bound by the findings as to the facts in so far as they are stated in a conviction or judicial decision of the requesting Party or in so far as such conviction or judicial decision is implicitly based on them.
3. Each Party may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that paragraph 2 of this article applies only subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system.
4. If the confiscation consists in the requirement to pay a sum of money, the competent authority of the requested Party shall convert the amount thereof into the currency of that Party at the time of exchange ruling at the time when the decision to enforce the confiscation is taken.
5. In the case of Article 13, paragraph 1.a, the requesting Party alone shall have the right to decide on any application for review of the confiscation order.

**Article 15 – Confiscated property**

Any property confiscated by the requested Party shall be disposed of by that Party in accordance with its domestic law, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties concerned.

**Article 16 – Right of enforcement and maximum amount of confiscation**

1. A request for confiscation made under Article 13 does not affect the right of the requesting Party to enforce itself the confiscation order.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be so interpreted as to permit the total value of the confiscation to exceed the amount of the sum of money specified in the confiscation order. If a Party finds that this might occur, the Parties concerned shall enter into consultations to avoid such an effect.

**Article 17 – Imprisonment in default**

The requested Party shall not impose imprisonment in default or any other measure restricting the liberty of a person as a result of a request under Article 13, if the requesting Party has so specified in the request.

**Article 18 – Grounds for refusal**

1. Co-operation under this chapter may be refused if:
   a. the action sought would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal system of the requested Party; or
   b. the execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of the requested Party; or
   c. in the opinion of the requested Party, the importance of the case to which the request relates does not justify the taking of the action sought; or
   d. the offence to which the request relates is a political or fiscal offence; or
   e. the requested Party considers that compliance with the action sought would be contrary to the principle of ne bis in idem; or
   f. the offence to which the request relates would not be an offence under the law of the requested Party if committed within its jurisdiction. However, this ground for refusal applies to co-operation under Section 2 only in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action.
2. Co-operation under Section 2, in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action, and under Section 3 of this chapter, may also be refused if the measures sought could not be taken under the domestic law of the requested Party for the purposes of investigations or proceedings, had it been a similar domestic case.
3. Where the law of the requested Party so requires, co-operation under Section 2, in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action, and under Section 3 of this chapter may also be refused if the measures sought or any other measures having similar effects would not be permitted under the law of the requesting Party, or, as regards the competent authorities of the requesting Party, if the request is not authorised by either a judge or another judicial authority, including public prosecutors, any of these authorities acting in relation to criminal offences.
4. Co-operation under Section 4 of this chapter may also be refused if:
   a. under the law of the requested Party confiscation is not provided for in respect of the type of offence to which the request relates; or
b without prejudice to the obligation pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 3, it would be contrary to the principles of the domestic laws of the requested Party concerning the limits of confiscation in respect of the relationship between an offence and:
i an economic advantage that might be qualified as its proceeds; or
ii property that might be qualified as its instrumentalities; or
c under the law of the requested Party confiscation may no longer be imposed or enforced because of the lapse of time; or
d the request does not relate to a previous conviction, or a decision of a judicial nature or a statement in such a decision that an offence or several offences have been committed, on the basis of which the confiscation has been ordered or is sought; or
e confiscation is either not enforceable in the requesting Party, or it is still subject to ordinary means of appeal; or
f the request relates to a confiscation order resulting from a decision rendered in absentia of the person against whom the order was issued and, in the opinion of the requested Party, the proceedings conducted by the requesting Party leading to such decision did not satisfy the minimum rights of defence recognised as due to everyone against whom a criminal charge is made.

5. For the purpose of paragraph 4.f of this article a decision is not considered to have been rendered in absentia if:
a it has been confirmed or pronounced after opposition by the person concerned; or
b it has been rendered on appeal, provided that the appeal was lodged by the person concerned.

6. When considering, for the purposes of paragraph 4.f of this article if the minimum rights of defence have been satisfied, the requested Party shall take into account the fact that the person concerned has deliberately sought to evade justice or the fact that that person, having had the possibility of lodging a legal remedy against the decision made in absentia, elected not to do so. The same will apply when the person concerned, having been duly served with the summons to appear, elected not to do so nor to ask for adjournment.

7. A Party shall not invoke bank secrecy as a ground to refuse any co-operation under this chapter. Where its domestic law so requires, a Party may require that a request for co-operation which would involve the lifting of bank secrecy be authorised by either a judge or another judicial authority, including public prosecutors, any of these authorities acting in relation to criminal offences.

8. Without prejudice to the ground for refusal provided for in paragraph 1.a of this article:
a the fact that the person under investigation or subjected to a confiscation order by the authorities of the requesting Party is a legal person shall not be invoked by the requested Party as an obstacle to affording any co-operation under this chapter;
b the fact that the natural person against whom an order of confiscation of proceeds has been issued has subsequently died or the fact that a legal person against whom an order of confiscation of proceeds has been issued has subsequently been dissolved shall not be invoked as an obstacle to render assistance in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 1.a.

Article 19 – Postponement
The requested Party may postpone action on a request if such action would prejudice investigations or proceedings by its authorities.

Article 20 – Partial or conditional granting of a request
Before refusing or postponing co-operation under this chapter, the requested Party shall, where appropriate after having consulted the requesting Party, consider whether the request may be granted partially or subject to such conditions as it deems necessary.

Article 21 – Notification of documents
1. The Parties shall afford each other the widest measure of mutual assistance in the serving of judicial documents to persons affected by provisional measures and confiscation.

2. Nothing in this article is intended to interfere with:
a the possibility of sending judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad;
b the possibility for judicial officers, officials or other competent authorities of the Party of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the consular authorities of that Party or through judicial officers, officials or other competent authorities of the Party of destination, unless the Party of destination makes a declaration to the contrary to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
3. When serving judicial documents to persons abroad affected by provisional measures or confiscation orders issued in the sending Party, this Party shall indicate what legal remedies are available under its law to such persons.

Article 22 – Recognition of foreign decisions
1. When dealing with a request for co-operation under Sections 3 and 4, the requested Party shall recognise any judicial decision taken in the requesting Party regarding rights claimed by third parties.
2. Recognition may be refused if:
a third parties did not have adequate opportunity to assert their rights; or
Article 14 - Disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime or property

1. Proceeds of crime or property confiscated by a State Party pursuant to articles 12 or 13, paragraph 1, of this Convention shall be disposed of by that State Party in accordance with its domestic law and administrative procedures.

2. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance with article 13 of this Convention, States Parties shall, to the extent permitted by domestic law and if so requested, give priority consideration to returning the confiscated proceeds of crime or property to the requesting State Party so that it can give compensation to the victims of the crime or return such proceeds of crime or property to their legitimate owners.

3. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance with articles 12 and 13 of this Convention, a State Party may give special consideration to concluding agreements or arrangements on:

   a) Contributing the value of such proceeds of crime or property or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds of crime or property or a part thereof to the account designated in accordance with article 30, paragraph 2 (c), of this Convention and to intergovernmental bodies specializing in the fight against organized crime;

   b) Sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds of crime or property, or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds of crime or property, in accordance with its domestic law or administrative procedures.
13.2.5 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 51 - General provision
The return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a fundamental principle of this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard.

Article 52 - Prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime
1. Without prejudice to article 14 of this Convention, each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic law, to require financial institutions within its jurisdiction to verify the identity of customers, to take reasonable steps to determine the identity of beneficial owners of funds deposited into high-value accounts and to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and their family members and close associates. Such enhanced scrutiny shall be reasonably designed to detect suspicious transactions for the purpose of reporting to competent authorities and should not be so construed as to discourage or prohibit financial institutions from doing business with any legitimate customer.

2. In order to facilitate implementation of the measures provided for in paragraph 1 of this article, each State Party, in accordance with its domestic law and inspired by relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering, shall:
   (a) Issue advisories regarding the types of natural or legal person to whose accounts financial institutions within its jurisdiction will be expected to apply enhanced scrutiny, the types of accounts and transactions to which to pay particular attention and appropriate account-opening, maintenance and record-keeping measures to take concerning such accounts; and
   (b) Where appropriate, notify financial institutions within its jurisdiction, at the request of another State Party or on its own initiative, of the identity of particular natural or legal persons to whose accounts such institutions will be expected to apply enhanced scrutiny, in addition to those whom the financial institutions may otherwise identify.

3. In the context of paragraph 2 (a) of this article, each State Party shall implement measures to ensure that its financial institutions maintain adequate records, over an appropriate period of time, of accounts and transactions involving the persons mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, which should, as a minimum, contain information relating to the identity of the customer as well as, as far as possible, of the beneficial owner.

4. With the aim of preventing and detecting transfers of proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention, each State Party shall implement appropriate and effective measures to prevent, with the help of its regulatory and oversight bodies, the establishment of banks that have no physical presence and that are not affiliated with a regulated financial group. Moreover, States Parties may consider requiring their financial institutions to refuse to enter into or continue a correspondent banking relationship with such institutions and to guard against establishing relations with foreign financial institutions that permit their accounts to be used by banks that have no physical presence and that are not affiliated with a regulated financial group.

5. Each State Party shall consider establishing, in accordance with its domestic law, effective financial disclosure systems for appropriate public officials and shall provide for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. Each State Party shall also consider taking such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to share that information with the competent authorities in other States Parties when necessary to investigate, claim and recover proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention.

6. Each State Party shall consider taking such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic law, to require appropriate public officials having an interest in or signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country to report that relationship to appropriate authorities and to maintain appropriate records related to such accounts. Such measures shall also provide for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance.

Article 53 - Measures for direct recovery of property
Each State Party shall, in accordance with its domestic law:
   (a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit another State Party to initiate civil action in its courts to establish title to or ownership of property acquired through the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention;
   (b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its courts to order those who have committed offences established in accordance with this Convention to pay compensation or damages to another State Party that has been harmed by such offences; and
   (c) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its courts or competent authorities, when having to decide on confiscation, to recognize another State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of property acquired through the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 54 - Mechanisms for recovery of property through international cooperation in confiscation
1. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assistance pursuant to article 55 of this Convention with respect to property acquired through or involved in the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention, shall, in accordance with its domestic law:
   (a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to give effect to an order of confiscation issued by a court of another State Party;
   (b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent authorities, where they have jurisdiction, to order the confiscation of such property of foreign origin by adjudication of an offence of money-laundering or such other offence as may be within its jurisdiction or by other procedures authorized under its domestic law; and
   (c) Consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation of such property without a criminal conviction in cases in which the offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases.
2. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assistance upon a request made pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 55 of this Convention, shall, in accordance with its domestic law:
   (a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to freeze or seize property upon a freezing or seizure order issued by a court or competent authority of a requesting State Party that provides a reasonable basis for the requested State Party to believe that there are sufficient grounds for taking such actions and that the property would eventually be subject to an order of confiscation for purposes of paragraph 1 (a) of this article;
   (b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to freeze or seize property upon a request that provides a reasonable basis for the requested State Party to believe that there are sufficient grounds for taking such actions and that the property would eventually be subject to an order of confiscation for purposes of paragraph 1 (a) of this article; and
   (c) Consider taking additional measures to permit its competent authorities to preserve property for confiscation, such as on the basis of a foreign arrest or criminal charge related to the acquisition of such property.

Article 55 - International cooperation for purposes of confiscation
1. A State Party that has received a request from another State Party having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with this Convention for confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 31, paragraph 1, of this Convention situated in its territory shall, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system:
   (a) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such an order is granted, give effect to it; or
   (b) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by a court in the territory of the requesting State Party in accordance with articles 31, paragraph 1, and 54, paragraph 1 (a), of this Convention insofar as it relates to proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 31, paragraph 1, situated in the territory of the requested State Party.
2. Following a request made by another State Party having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with this Convention, the requested State Party shall take measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 31, paragraph 1, of this Convention for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by the requesting State Party or, pursuant to a request under paragraph 1 of this article, by the requested State Party.
3. The provisions of article 46 of this Convention are applicable, mutates mutandis, to this article. In addition to the information specified in article 46, paragraph 15, requests made pursuant to this article shall contain:
   (a) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (a) of this article, a description of the property to be confiscated, including, to the extent possible, the location and, where relevant, the estimated value of the property and a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party sufficient to enable the requested State Party to seek the order under its domestic law;
   (b) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (b) of this article, a legally admissible copy of an order of confiscation upon which the request is based issued by the requesting State Party, a statement of the facts and information as to the extent to which execution of the order is requested, a statement specifying the measures taken by the requesting State Party to provide adequate notification to bona fide third parties and to ensure due process and a statement that the confiscation order is final;
   (c) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 2 of this article, a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party and a description of the actions requested and, where available, a legally admissible copy of an order on which the request is based.
4. The decisions or actions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall be taken by the requested State Party in accordance with and subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in relation to the requesting State Party.
5. Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws and regulations that give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws and regulations or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
6. If a State Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article conditional on the existence of a relevant treaty, that State Party shall consider this Convention the necessary and sufficient treaty basis.
7. Cooperation under this article may also be refused or provisional measures lifted if the requested State Party does not receive sufficient and timely evidence or if the property is of a de minimis value.

8. Before lifting any provisional measure taken pursuant to this article, the requested State Party shall, wherever possible, give the requesting State Party an opportunity to present its reasons in favour of continuing the measure.

9. The provisions of this article shall not be construed as prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties.

Article 56 - Special cooperation
Without prejudice to its domestic law, each State Party shall endeavour to take measures to permit it to forward, without prejudice to its own investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings, information on proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention to another State Party without prior request, when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving State Party in initiating or carrying out investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings or might lead to a request by that State Party under this chapter of the Convention.

Article 57 - Return and disposal of assets
1. Property confiscated by a State Party pursuant to article 31 or 55 of this Convention shall be disposed of, including by return to its prior legitimate owners, pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article, by that State Party in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and its domestic law.

2. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to return confiscated property, when acting on the request made by another State Party, in accordance with this Convention, taking into account the rights of bona fide third parties.

3. In accordance with articles 46 and 55 of this Convention and paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the requested State Party shall:
   (a) In the case of embezzlement of public funds or of laundering of embezzled public funds as referred to in articles 17 and 23 of this Convention, when confiscation was executed in accordance with article 55 and on the basis of a final judgement in the requesting State Party, a requirement that can be waived by the requested State Party, return the confiscated property to the requesting State Party;
   (b) In the case of proceeds of any other offence covered by this Convention, when the confiscation was executed in accordance with article 55 of this Convention and on the basis of a final judgement in the requesting State Party, a requirement that can be waived by the requested State Party, return the confiscated property to the requesting State Party, when the requesting State Party reasonably establishes its prior ownership of such confiscated property to the requested State Party or when the requested State Party recognizes damage to the requesting State Party as a basis for returning the confiscated property;
   (c) In all other cases, give priority consideration to returning confiscated property to the requesting State Party, returning such property to its prior legitimate owners or compensating the victims of the crime.

4. Where appropriate, unless States Parties decide otherwise, the requested State Party may deduct reasonable expenses incurred in investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings leading to the return or disposition of confiscated property pursuant to this article.

5. Where appropriate, States Parties may also give special consideration to concluding agreements or mutually acceptable arrangements, on a case-by-case basis, for the final disposal of confiscated property.

Article 59- Bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements
States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation undertaken pursuant to this chapter of the Convention.

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13.3 Jurisdiction and Extradition

13.3.1 FATF 40 Recommendation

Recommendation 39
Countries should recognise money laundering as an extraditable offence. Each country should either extradite its own nationals, or where a country does not do so solely on the grounds of nationality, that country should, at the request of the country seeking extradition, submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request. Those authorities should take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the domestic law of that country. The countries concerned should cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecutions. Subject to their legal frameworks, countries may consider simplifying extradition by allowing direct transmission of extradition requests between appropriate ministries, extraditing persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgements, and/or introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive formal extradition proceedings.

13.3.2 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Article 4
1. Each Party:
(a) Shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when:
(i) The offence is committed in its territory;
(ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which is registered under its laws at the time the offence is committed;
(b) May take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when:
(i) The offence is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who has his habitual residence in its territory;
(ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel concerning which that Party has been authorized to take appropriate action pursuant to article 17, provided that such jurisdiction shall be exercised only on the basis of agreements or arrangements referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of that article;
(iii) The offence is one of those established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph (c)(iv), and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission, within its territory, of an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.
2. Each Party:
(a) Shall also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party on the ground:
(i) That the offence has been committed in its territory or on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which was registered under its law at the time the offence was committed; or
(ii) That the offence has been committed by one of its nationals;
(b) May also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party.
3. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a Party in accordance with its domestic law.

Article 6
1. This article shall apply to the offences established by the Parties in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.
2. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between Parties. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
3. If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to which this article applies. The Parties which require detailed legislation in order to use this Convention as a legal basis for extradition shall consider enacting such legislation as may be necessary.
4. The Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditable offences between themselves.
5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds upon which the requested Party may refuse extradition.
6. In considering requests received pursuant to this article, the requested State may refuse to comply with such requests where there are substantial grounds leading its judicial or other competent authorities to believe that compliance would facilitate the prosecution or punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions, or would cause prejudice for any of those reasons to any person affected by the request.
7. The Parties shall endeavour to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies.
8. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the requested Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent, and at the request of the requesting Party, take a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his presence at extradition proceedings.
9. Without prejudice to the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established in accordance with its domestic law, a Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found shall:
   (a) If it does not extradite him in respect of an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, on the grounds set forth in article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph (a), submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless otherwise agreed with the requesting Party;
   (b) If it does not extradite him in respect of such an offence and has established its jurisdiction in relation to that offence in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph (b), submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless otherwise requested by the requesting Party for the purposes of preserving its legitimate jurisdiction.
10. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because the person sought is a national of the requested Party, the requested Party shall, if its law so permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting Party, consider the enforcement of the sentence which has been imposed under the law of the requesting Party, or the remainder thereof.
11. The Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.
12. The Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements, whether ad hoc or general, on the transfer to their country of persons sentenced to imprisonment and other forms of deprivation of liberty for offences to which this article applies, in order that they may complete their sentences there.

13.3.3  2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 11 - Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions
1. Each State Party shall make the commission of an offence established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence.
2. Each State Party shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences covered by this Convention are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences.
3. In the case of offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention, each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic law and with due regard to the rights of the defence, to seek to ensure that conditions imposed in connection with decisions on release pending trial or appeal take into consideration the need to ensure the presence of the defendant at subsequent criminal proceedings.
4. Each State Party shall ensure that its courts or other competent authorities bear in mind the grave nature of the offences covered by this Convention when considering the eventuality of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences.
5. Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence covered by this Convention and a longer period where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice.
6. Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention and of the applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law.

Article 15 - Jurisdiction
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention when:
   (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or
   (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed.
2. Subject to article 4 of this Convention, a State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
   (a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party;
(b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory; or
(c) The offence is:
   (i) One of those established in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of a serious crime within its territory;
   (ii) One of those established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1(b), of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1(a) or (ii) or (b) or (ii), of this Convention within its territory.

3. For the purposes of article 16, paragraph 10, of this Convention, each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.

4. Each State Party may also adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her.

5. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that one or more other States Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions.

6. Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.

Article 16 - Extradition

1. This article shall apply to the offences covered by this Convention or in cases where an offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1(a) or (b), involves an organized criminal group and the person who is the subject of the request for extradition is located in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party and the requested State Party.

2. If the request for extradition includes several separate serious crimes, some of which are not covered by this article, the requested State Party may apply this article also in respect of the latter offences.

3. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

4. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to which this article applies.

5. States Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall:
   (a) At the time of deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval of or accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations whether they will take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention; and
   (b) If they do not take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention in order to implement this article.

6. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditable offences between themselves.

7. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition.

8. States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies.

9. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent and at the request of the requesting State Party, take a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at extradition proceedings.

10. A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall then take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that State Party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution.

11. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State Party to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought and that State Party and the State Party seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms that they may deem appropriate, such conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 10 of this article.
12. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because the person sought is a national of the requested State Party, the requested Party shall, if its domestic law so permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting Party, consider the enforcement of the sentence that has been imposed under the domestic law of the requesting Party or the remainder thereof.

13. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party in the territory of which that person is present.

14. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of these reasons.

15. States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.

16. Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where appropriate, consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample opportunity to present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation.

17. States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.

**Article 17 - Transfer of sentenced persons**

States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty for offences covered by this Convention, in order that they may complete their sentences there.

13.3.4 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

**Article 42 - Jurisdiction**

1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this Convention when:
   (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or
   (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed.

2. Subject to article 43 of this Convention, a State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
   (a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party; or
   (b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory; or
   (c) The offence is one of those established in accordance with article 23, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 23, paragraph 1 (a) (i) or (ii) or (b) (i), of this Convention within its territory; or
   (d) The offence is committed against the State Party.

3. For the purposes of article 44 of this Convention, each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.

4. Each State Party may also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her.

5. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that any other States Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions.

6. Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this Convention shall not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.

**Article 44 - Extradition**

1. This article shall apply to the offences established in accordance with this Convention where the person who is the subject of the request for extradition is present in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party and the requested State Party.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a State Party whose law so permits may grant the extradition of a person for any of the offences covered by this Convention that are not punishable under its own domestic law.
3. If the request for extradition includes several separate offences, at least one of which is extraditable under this article and some of which are not extraditable by reason of their period of imprisonment but are related to offences established in accordance with this Convention, the requested State Party may apply this article also in respect of those offences.
4. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. A State Party whose law so permits, in case it uses this Convention as the basis for extradition, shall not consider any of the offences established in accordance with this Convention to be a political offence.
5. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to which this article applies.
6. A State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall:
   (a) At the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations whether it will take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention; and
   (b) If it does not take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention in order to implement this article.
7. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditable offences between themselves.
8. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition.
9. States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies.
10. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent and at the request of the requesting State Party, take a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at extradition proceedings.
11. A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that State Party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution.
12. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State Party to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought and that State Party and the State Party seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms that they may deem appropriate, such conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 11 of this article.
13. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because the person sought is a national of the requested State Party, the requested State Party shall, if its domestic law so permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting State Party, consider the enforcement of the sentence imposed under the domestic law of the requesting State Party or the remainder thereof.
14. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party in the territory of which that person is present.
15. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of these reasons.
16. States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
17. Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where appropriate, consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample opportunity to present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation.
18. States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.

**Article 45 - Transfer of sentenced persons**
States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty for offences established in accordance with this Convention in order that they may complete their sentences there.
13.3.5 Council of the EU Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States

Article 1 – Definition of the European arrest warrant and obligation to execute it
1. The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.
2. Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision.
3. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.

Article 2 - Scope of the European arrest warrant
1. A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months.
2. The following offences, if they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they are defined by the law of the issuing Member State, shall, under the terms of this Framework Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise to surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant:
   - participation in a criminal organisation,
   - terrorism,
   - trafficking in human beings,
   - sexual exploitation of children and child pornography,
   - illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
   - illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives,
   - corruption,
   - fraud, including that affecting the financial interests of the European Communities within the meaning of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests,
   - laundering of the proceeds of crime,
   - counterfeiting currency, including of the euro,
   - computer-related crime,
   - environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered plant species and varieties,
   - facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence,
   - murder, grievous bodily injury,
   - illicit trade in human organs and tissue,
   - kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking,
   - racism and xenophobia,
   - organised or armed robbery,
   - illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art,
   - swindling,
   - racketeering and extortion,
   - counterfeiting and piracy of products,
   - forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein,
   - forgery of means of payment,
   - illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters,
   - illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials,
   - trafficking in stolen vehicles,
   - rape,
   - arson,
   - crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,
   - unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships,
   - sabotage.
3. The Council may decide at any time, acting unanimously after consultation of the European Parliament under the conditions laid down in Article 39(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), to add other categories of offence to the list contained in paragraph 2. The Council shall examine, in the light of the report submitted by the Commission pursuant to Article 34(3), whether the list should be extended or amended.
4. For offences other than those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is described.
13.4 Ratification and implementation

13.4.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 35
Countries should take immediate steps to become party to and implement fully the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, and the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Countries are also encouraged to ratify and implement other relevant international conventions, such as the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism.

13.4.2 1998 UN Political Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering

The General Assembly
1. Strongly condemns the laundering of money derived from illicit drug trafficking and other serious crimes, as well as the use of the financial systems of States for that purpose;
2. Urges all States to implement the provisions against money-laundering that are contained in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and the other relevant international instruments on money-laundering, in accordance with fundamental constitutional principles, by applying the following principles:
   (a) Establishment of a legislative framework to criminalize the laundering of money derived from serious crimes in order to provide for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of the crime of money-laundering through, inter alia:
      (i) Identification, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime;
      (ii) International cooperation; and mutual legal assistance in cases involving money-laundering;
      (iii) Inclusion of the crime of money-laundering in mutual legal assistance agreements for the purpose of ensuring judicial assistance in investigations, court cases or judicial proceedings relating to that crime;
   (b) Establishment of an effective financial and regulatory regime to deny criminals and their illicit funds access to national and international financial systems, thus preserving the integrity of financial systems worldwide and ensuring compliance with laws and other regulations against money-laundering through:
      (i) Customer identification and verification requirements applying the principle of "know your customer", in order to have available for competent authorities the necessary information on the identity of clients and the financial movements that they carry out;
      (ii) Financial record-keeping;
      (iii) Mandatory reporting of suspicious activity;
      (iv) Removal of bank secrecy impediments to efforts directed at preventing, investigating and punishing money-laundering;
      (v) Other relevant measures;
   (c) Implementation of law enforcement measures to provide tools for, inter alia:
      (i) Effective detection, investigation, prosecution and conviction of criminals engaging in money-laundering activity;
      (ii) Extradition procedures;
      (iii) Information-sharing mechanisms;

13.4.3 2001 Conference of the G8 Ministers of Justice and Interior

The Ministers of Justice and Interior of the G 8
12. reaffirm the Principles of the Moscow Communiqué, which stressed the importance of the fight against money laundering within the strategy of countering transnational organised crime;
13. commend the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to identify jurisdictions whose anti-money laundering systems do not meet the international standards of the FATF Forty Recommendations, and to take all appropriate measures to bring those non-co-operative jurisdictions into compliance with those standards;
14. strongly reaffirm the need for legislative and administrative measures aimed at assuring transparency of the financial systems. We encourage the development of common principles to remove obstacles, such as bank secrecy, to the rapid and effective implementation of requests for mutual legal assistance in banking and tax matters;
15. will intensify our joint efforts to improve effective international co-operation and mutual legal assistance in the confiscation of illicit assets, including through measures contained in the Palermo Convention and in existing regional and bilateral agreements;
13.4.4 Council of the EU Framework Decision on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime

Article 1 - Reservations in respect of the 1990 Convention
In order to enhance action against organised crime, Member States shall take the necessary steps not to make or uphold reservations in respect of the following articles of the 1990 Convention:
(a) Article 2, in so far as the offence is punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year. However, Member States may uphold reservations on Article 2 of the 1990 Convention in respect of the confiscation of the proceeds from tax offences for the sole purpose of their being able to confiscate such proceeds, both nationally and through international cooperation, under national, Community and international tax-debt recovery legislation;
(b) Article 6, in so far as serious offences are concerned. Such offences shall in any event include offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year or, as regards those States which have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months.

13.4.5 2001 Joint ECOFIN/JHA meeting

11. The Council emphasises strongly the importance for all Member States, the Candidate Countries and for dependent and associated territories of Member States to implement fully the Union acquis on the fight against terrorism, money laundering and financial crime, the 40 FATF Recommendations on money laundering and to take appropriate measures to be able to implement the counter-measures recommended by FATF. In particular, the Council welcomes the commitment of the Hungarian Government to improve anti-money laundering standards and urges the speedy adoption by the Hungarian Parliament of the measures required to meet all the FATF recommendations. The Council welcomes the Commission's intention to reinforce the scrutiny of the Candidate Countries' anti-money laundering activities in the Peer Reviews that are now under way.
14 FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS (FIU)

14.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 26
Countries should establish a FIU that serves as a national centre for the receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and dissemination of STR and other information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing. The FIU should have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STR.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 26
Where a country has created an FIU, it should consider applying for membership in the Egmont Group. Countries should have regard to the Egmont Group Statement of Purpose, and its Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units for Money Laundering Cases. These documents set out important guidance concerning the role and functions of FIUs, and the mechanisms for exchanging information between FIU.

The Glossary
“FIU” means financial intelligence unit.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 40
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4. FIUs should be able to make inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts where this could be relevant to an analysis of financial transactions. At a minimum, inquiries should include:
- Searching its own databases, which would include information related to suspicious transaction reports.
- Searching other databases to which it may have direct or indirect access, including law enforcement databases, public databases, administrative databases and commercially available databases.
  Where permitted to do so, FIUs should also contact other competent authorities and financial institutions in order to obtain relevant information.

14.1.2 Egmont – Statement of purpose

Definition of Financial Intelligence Unit:
A central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information
(i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or
(ii) required by national legislation or regulation,
in order to counter money laundering.

Conditions for the exchange of information
9. FIUs should be able to exchange information freely with other FIUs in the basis of reciprocity or mutual agreement and consistent with procedures understood by the requested and requesting party. Such exchange, either upon request or spontaneously, should produce any available information that may be relevant to an analysis or investigation of financial transactions and other relevant information related to money laundering and the persons or companies involved.
10. An FIU requesting information should disclose, to the FIU that will process the request, at a minimum the reason for the request, the purpose for which the information will be used and enough information to enable the receiving FIU to determine whether the request complies with its domestic law.

Permitted uses of information
11. Information exchanged between FIUs may be used only for the specific purpose for which the information was sought or provided.
12. The requesting FIU may not transfer information shared by a disclosing FIU to a third party, nor make use of the information in an administrative, investigative, prosecutorial, or judicial purpose without the prior consent of the FIU that disclosed the information.

Confidentiality – Protection of privacy
13. All information exchanged by FIUs must be subject to strict controls and safeguards to ensure that the information is used only in an authorised manner, consistent with national provisions on privacy and data protection. At a minimum, exchanged information must be treated as protected by the same confidentiality provisions as apply to similar information from domestic sources obtained by the receiving FIU.
14.1.3 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 58 - Financial intelligence unit
States Parties shall cooperate with one another for the purpose of preventing and combating the transfer of proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention and of promoting ways and means of recovering such proceeds and, to that end, shall consider establishing a financial intelligence unit to be responsible for receiving, analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities reports of suspicious financial transactions.

14.1.4 Council of the EU Decision concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information

Article 1
1. Member States shall ensure that FIUs, set up or designated to receive disclosures of financial information for the purpose of combating money laundering shall cooperate to assemble, analyse and investigate relevant information within the FIU on any fact which might be an indication of money laundering in accordance with their national powers.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that FIUs exchange, spontaneously or on request and either in accordance with this Decision or in accordance with existing or future memoranda of understanding, any available information that may be relevant to the processing or analysis of information or to investigation by the FIU regarding financial transactions related to money laundering and the natural or legal persons involved.
3. Where a Member State has designated a police authority as its FIU, it may supply information held by that FIU to be exchanged pursuant to this Decision to an authority of the receiving Member State designated for that purpose and being competent in the areas mentioned in paragraph 1.

Article 2
1. Member States shall ensure that, for the purposes of this Decision, FIUs shall be a single unit for each Member State and shall correspond to the following definition: “A central, national unit which, in order to combat money laundering, is responsible for receiving (and to the extent permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information which concern suspected proceeds of crime or are required by national legislation or regulation”.
2. In the context of paragraph 1, a Member State may establish a central unit for the purpose of receiving or transmitting information to or from decentralised agencies.
3. Member States shall indicate the unit which is an FIU within the meaning of this Article. They shall notify this information to the General Secretariat of the Council in writing. This notification does not affect the current relations concerning cooperation between the FIUs.

Article 3
Member States shall ensure that the performance of the functions of the FIUs under this Decision shall not be affected by their internal status, regardless of whether they are administrative, law enforcement or judicial authorities.

Article 4
1. Each request made under this Decision shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the relevant facts known to the requesting FIU. The FIU shall specify in the request how the information sought will be used.
2. When a request is made in accordance with this Decision, the requested FIU shall provide all relevant information, including available financial information and requested law enforcement data, sought in the request, without the need for a formal letter of request under applicable conventions or agreements between Member States
3. An FIU may refuse to divulge information which could lead to impairment of a criminal investigation being conducted in the requested Member State or, in exceptional circumstances, where divulgence of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or the Member State concerned or would otherwise not be in accordance with fundamental principles of national law. Any such refusal shall be appropriately explained to the FIU requesting the information.

Article 5
1. Information or documents obtained under this Decision are intended to be used for the purposes laid down in Article 1(1).
2. When transmitting information or documents pursuant to this Decision, the transmitting FIU may impose restrictions and conditions on the use of information for purposes other than those stipulated in paragraph 1. The receiving FIU shall comply with any such restrictions and conditions.
3. Where a Member State wishes to use transmitted information or documents for criminal investigations or prosecutions for the purposes laid down in Article 1(1), the transmitting Member State may not refuse its consent to such use unless it does so on the basis of restrictions under its national law or conditions referred to in Article 4(3). Any refusal to grant consent shall be appropriately explained.
4. FIUs shall undertake all necessary measures, including security measures, to ensure that information submitted under this Decision is not accessible by any other authorities, agencies or departments. 
5. The information submitted will be protected, in conformity with the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and taking account of Recommendation No R(87)15 of 15 September 1987 of the Council of Europe Regulating the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector, by at least the same rules of confidentiality and protection of personal data as those that apply under the national legislation applicable to the requesting FIU.

**Article 6**
1. FIUs may, within the limits of the applicable national law and without a request to that effect, exchange relevant information.
2. Article 5 shall apply in relation to information forwarded under this Article.

**Article 7**
Member States shall provide for, and agree on, appropriate and protected channels of communication between FIUs.

**Article 8**
This Decision shall be implemented without prejudice to the Member States' obligations towards Europol, as they have been laid down in the Europol Convention.

**Article 9**
1. To the extent that the level of cooperation between FIUs, as expressed in memoranda of understanding concluded or to be concluded between authorities of the Member States, is compatible with this Decision or goes further than the provisions thereof, it shall remain unaffected by this Decision. Where the provisions of this Decision go further than the provisions of any memorandum of understanding concluded between the authorities of Member States, this Decision shall supersede such memoranda of understanding two years after this Decision takes effect.
2. The Member States shall ensure that they are able to cooperate fully in accordance with the provisions of this Decision at the latest three years after this Decision takes effect.
3. The Council will assess Member States' compliance with this Decision within four years of the date on which it takes effect, and may decide to continue such assessments on a regular basis.

**Article 10**
This Decision shall apply to Gibraltar. To this effect, notwithstanding Article 2, the United Kingdom may notify to the General Secretariat of the Council an FIU in Gibraltar.

14.1.5 2001 Joint ECOFIN/JHA meeting

13. The Council reconfirms the importance of close cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) of the Member States in respect of exchanging information on suspicious transactions including those related to terrorism. The adoption of the Decision on exchange of information between FIUs at the joint ECOFIN/JHA Council meeting on 17 October 2000 was a significant step in elaborating mutual cooperation between Member States' FIUs. Consequently the Member States have to ensure uniform implementation of the Decision, including providing for appropriate and protected channels of communications between FIUs. The Council confirms the necessity to enhance the communication between FIUs and calls upon the Member States to reinforce the existing system and to examine whether to elaborate a system for exchange of relevant information by automatic means and asks the Commission to explore the possibilities of Community funding for such an automatic system.
15 OTHER ISSUES

15.1 Controlled delivery

15.1.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 27
Countries should ensure that designated law enforcement authorities have responsibility for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations. Countries are encouraged to support and develop, as far as possible, special investigative techniques suitable for the investigation of money laundering, such as controlled delivery, undercover operations and other relevant techniques. Countries are also encouraged to use other effective mechanisms such as the use of permanent or temporary groups specialised in asset investigation, and co-operative investigations with appropriate competent authorities in other countries.

Interpretative note to Recommendation 27
Countries should consider taking measures, including legislative ones, at the national level, to allow their competent authorities investigating money laundering cases to postpone or waive the arrest of suspected persons and/or the seizure of the money for the purpose of identifying persons involved in such activities or for evidence gathering. Without such measures the use of procedures such as controlled deliveries and undercover operations are precluded.

15.1.2 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Article 1
(g) "Controlled delivery" means the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, substances in Table I and Table II annexed to this Convention, or substances substituted for them, to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more countries, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to identifying persons involved in the commission of offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention;

Article 11
1. If permitted by the basic principles of their respective domestic legal systems, the Parties shall take the necessary measures, within their possibilities, to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery at the international level, on the basis of agreements or arrangements mutually consented to, with a view to identifying persons involved in offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, and to taking legal action against them.
2. Decisions to use controlled delivery shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary, take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Parties concerned.
3. Illicit consignments whose controlled delivery is agreed to may, with the consent of the Parties concerned, be intercepted and allowed to continue with the narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances intact or removed or replaced in whole or in part.

15.1.3 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 2 – Use of terms
For the purpose of this Convention.
(i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence;

Article 20 - Special investigative techniques
1. If permitted by the basic principles of its domestic legal system, each State Party shall, within its possibilities and under the conditions prescribed by its domestic law, take the necessary measures to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery and, where it deems appropriate, for the use of other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover operations, by its competent authorities in its territory for the purpose of effectively combating organized crime.
2. For the purpose of investigating the offences covered by this Convention, States Parties are encouraged to conclude, when necessary, appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements for using such special investigative
techniques in the context of cooperation at the international level. Such agreements or arrangements shall be concluded
and implemented in full compliance with the principle of sovereign equality of States and shall be carried out strictly in
accordance with the terms of those agreements or arrangements.
3. In the absence of an agreement or arrangement as set forth in paragraph 2 of this article, decisions to use such special
investigative techniques at the international level shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary,
take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
States Parties concerned.
4. Decisions to use controlled delivery at the international level may, with the consent of the States Parties concerned,
include methods such as intercepting and allowing the goods to continue intact or be removed or replaced in whole or in
part.

15.1.4 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 2 - Use of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
(i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or
into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities,
with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the
offence.

Article 50 - Special investigative techniques
1. In order to combat corruption effectively, each State Party shall, to the extent permitted by the basic principles of its
domestic legal system and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by its domestic law, take such measures as may
be necessary, within its means, to allow for the appropriate use by its competent authorities of controlled delivery and,
where it deems appropriate, other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and
undercover operations, within its territory, and to allow for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.
2. For the purpose of investigating the offences covered by this Convention, States Parties are encouraged to conclude,
when necessary, appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements for using such special investigative
techniques in the context of cooperation at the international level. Such agreements or arrangements shall be concluded
and implemented in full compliance with the principle of sovereign equality of States and shall be carried out strictly in
accordance with the terms of those agreements or arrangements.
3. In the absence of an agreement or arrangement as set forth in paragraph 2 of this article, decisions to use such special
investigative techniques at the international level shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary, take
into consideration financial arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States
Parties concerned.
4. Decisions to use controlled delivery at the international level may, with the consent of the States Parties concerned,
include methods such as intercepting and allowing the goods to continue intact or be removed or replaced in whole or in
part.

15.1.5 The 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the EU

Article 12 - Controlled deliveries
1. Each Member State shall undertake to ensure that, at the request of another Member State, controlled deliveries may
be permitted on its territory in the framework of criminal investigations into extraditable offences.
2. The decision to carry out controlled deliveries shall be taken in each individual case by the competent authorities of
the requested Member State, with due regard for the national law of that Member State.
3. Controlled deliveries shall take place in accordance with the procedures of the requested Member State. The
right to act and to direct and control operations shall lie with the competent authorities of that Member State.

15.2 Cross-border transportation of cash

15.2.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 19
Countries should consider:
a) Implementing feasible measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer
negotiable instruments, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any
way the freedom of capital movements.
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Interpretative note to Recommendation 19
1. To facilitate detection and monitoring of cash transactions, without impeding in any way the freedom of capital movements, countries could consider the feasibility of subjecting all crossborder transfers, above a given threshold, to verification, administrative monitoring, declaration or record keeping requirements.

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15.2.2 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 7 - Measures to combat money-laundering

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2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments.

15.2.3 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 14 - Measures to prevent money-laundering

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2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments.

15.3 Immunity clause

15.3.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 4
Countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation of the FATF Recommendations.

Recommendation 14
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be:
a) Protected by legal provisions from criminal and civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the FIU, even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred.

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Article 9
The disclosure in good faith to the authorities responsible for combating money laundering by an institution or person subject to this Directive or by an employee or director of such an institution or person of the information referred to in Articles 6 and 7 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, and shall not involve the institution or person or its directors or employees in liability of any kind.
15.4 New techniques

15.4.1 FATF 40 Recommendations

Recommendation 20

Countries should further encourage the development of modern and secure techniques of money management that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

15.4.2 1990 CoE Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime

Article 4 – Special investigative powers and techniques

2 Each Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to use special investigative techniques facilitating the identification and tracing of proceeds and the gathering of evidence related thereto. Such techniques may include monitoring orders, observation, interception of telecommunications, access to computer systems and orders to produce specific documents.

15.4.3 2003 UN Convention against Corruption

Article 14 - Measures to prevent money-laundering

3. States Parties shall consider implementing appropriate and feasible measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters:
   (a) To include on forms for the electronic transfer of funds and related messages accurate and meaningful information on the originator;
   (b) To maintain such information throughout the payment chain; and
   (c) To apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds that do not contain complete information on the originator.

Article 49 - Joint investigations

States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements whereby, in relation to matters that are the subject of investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in one or more States, the competent authorities concerned may establish joint investigative bodies. In the absence of such agreements or arrangements, joint investigations may be undertaken by agreement on a case-by-case basis. The States Parties involved shall ensure that the sovereignty of the State Party in whose territory such investigation is to take place is fully respected.

15.4.4 The 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the EU

Article 14 - Covert investigations

1. The requesting and the requested Member State may agree to assist one another in the conduct of investigations into crime by officers acting under covert or false identity (covert investigations).
2. The decision on the request is taken in each individual case by the competent authorities of the requested Member State with due regard to its national law and procedures. The duration of the covert investigation, the detailed conditions, and the legal status of the officers concerned during covert investigations shall be agreed between the Member States with due regard to their national law and procedures.
3. Covert investigations shall take place in accordance with the national law and procedures of the Member States on the territory of which the covert investigation takes place. The Member States involved shall cooperate to ensure that the covert investigation is prepared and supervised and to make arrangements for the security of the officers acting under covert or false identity.
4. When giving the notification provided for in Article 27(2), any Member State may declare that it is not bound by this Article. Such a declaration may be withdrawn at any time.
16 TERRORIST FINANCING

16.1.1 FATF 8 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing

I. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments
Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Countries should also immediately implement the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.

II. Criminalising the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering
Each country should criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money laundering predicate offences.

III. Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets
Each country should implement measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist organisations in accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.

Each country should also adopt and implement measures, including legislative ones, which would enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations.

IV. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism
If financial institutions, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations, they should be required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities.

V. International co-operation
Each country should afford another country, on the basis of a treaty, arrangement or other mechanism for mutual legal assistance or information exchange, the greatest possible measure of assistance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations.

Countries should also take all possible measures to ensure that they do not provide safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations, and should have procedures in place to extradite, where possible, such individuals.

VI. Alternative remittance
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions.

VII. Wire transfers
Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and account number) on funds transfers and related messages that are sent, and the information should remain with the transfer or related message through the payment chain.

Countries should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activity funds transfers which do not contain complete originator information (name, address and account number).

VIII. Non-profit organisations
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused:
- by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
- to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and
- to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations.
Article 1
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Funds" means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.
2. "State or governmental facility" means any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State, members of Government, the legislature or the judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public authority or entity or by employees or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official duties.
3. "Proceeds" means any funds derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence set forth in article 2.

Article 2
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
   (a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
   (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
2. (a) On depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a State Party which is not a party to a treaty listed in the annex may declare that, in the application of this Convention to the State Party, the treaty shall be deemed not to be included in the annex referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a). The declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as the treaty enters into force for the State Party, which shall notify the depositary of this fact;
   (b) When a State Party ceases to be a party to a treaty listed in the annex, it may make a declaration as provided for in this article, with respect to that treaty.
3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b).
4. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.
5. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
   (a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article;
   (b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article;
   (c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraphs 1 or 4 of this article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
      (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article; or
      (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 4
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:
(a) To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in article 2;
(b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of the offences.

Article 5
1. Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.
2. Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offences.
3. Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance with paragraph 1 above are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions.
Article 6
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

Article 8
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture.
2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture of funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 and the proceeds derived from such offences.
3. Each State Party concerned may give consideration to concluding agreements on the sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, of the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article.
4. Each State Party shall consider establishing mechanisms whereby the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article are utilized to compensate the victims of offences referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), or their families.
5. The provisions of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

16.1.3 UN Resolution 1373
1. Decides that all States shall:
   (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
   (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
   (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
   (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;

2. Decides also that all States shall:
   (a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
   (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
   (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
   (d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
   (e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
   (f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
   (g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;

3. Calls upon all States to:
   (a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;

4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

16.1.4 Wolfsberg Statement on the suppression of the financing of terrorism

4 Know Your Customer
The Wolfsberg Group recognises that adherence to existing "Know Your Customer" policies and procedures is important to the fight against terrorism. Specifically the proper identification of customers by financial institutions can improve the efficacy of searches against lists of known or suspected terrorists issued by competent authorities having jurisdiction over the relevant financial institution ("applicable lists").
In addition to the continued application of existing customer identification, acceptance and due diligence procedures, the Wolfsberg Group is committed to:

• Implementing procedures for consulting applicable lists and taking reasonable and practicable steps to determine whether a person involved in a prospective or existing business relationship appears on such a list.
• Reporting to the relevant authorities matches from lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organisations consistent with applicable laws and regulations regarding the disclosure of customer information.
• Exploring with governmental agencies ways of improving information exchange within and between jurisdictions.
• Exploring ways of improving the maintenance of customer information to facilitate the timely retrieval of such information.

5 High Risk Sectors and Activities
The Wolfsberg Group is committed to applying enhanced and appropriate due diligence in relation to those of their customers engaged in sectors and activities which have been identified by competent authorities as being widely used for the financing of terrorism, such as underground banking businesses or alternative remittance systems. This will include the adoption, to the extent not already in place, of specific policies and procedures on acceptance of business from customers engaged in such sectors or activities, and increased monitoring of activity of customers who meet the relevant acceptance criteria.
In particular the Wolfsberg Group is committed to restricting their business relationships with remittance businesses, exchange houses, casas de cambio, bureaux de change and money transfer agents to those which are subject to appropriate regulation aimed at preventing such activities and businesses from being used as a conduit to launder the proceeds of crime and/or finance terrorism.
The Wolfsberg Group recognises that many jurisdictions are currently in the process of developing and implementing regulations with regard to these businesses and that appropriate time needs to be given for these regulations to take effect.

6 Monitoring
Recognising the difficulties inherent in identifying financial transactions linked to the financing of terrorism (many of which appear routine in relation to information known at the time) the Wolfsberg Group is committed to the continued application of existing monitoring procedures for identifying unusual or suspicious transactions. The Wolfsberg Group recognises that while the motive for such transactions may be unclear, monitoring and then identifying and reporting unusual or suspicious transactions may assist government agencies by linking seemingly unrelated activity to the financing of terrorism.
In addition, the Wolfsberg Group is committed to:
• Exercising heightened scrutiny in respect of customers engaged in sectors identified by competent authorities as being widely used for the financing of terrorism.
• Monitoring account and transactional activity (to the extent meaningful information is available to financial institutions) against lists generated by competent authorities of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organisations.
• Working with governments and agencies in order to recognise patterns and trends identified as related to the financing of terrorism.
• Considering the modification of existing monitoring procedures as necessary to assist in the identification of such patterns and trends.

7 Need for Enhanced Global Co-operation
The Wolfsberg Group is committed to co-operating with and assisting law enforcement and government agencies in their efforts to combat the financing of terrorism. The Wolfsberg Group has identified the following areas for discussion with governmental agencies, with a view to enhancing the contribution financial institutions are able to make:

• The provision of official lists of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisations on a globally co-ordinated basis by the relevant competent authority in each jurisdiction.
• The inclusion of appropriate details and information in official lists to assist financial institutions in efficient and timely searches of their customer bases. This information should ideally include (where known) in the case of individuals: date of birth; place of birth; passport or identity card number; in the case of corporations; place of incorporation or establishment; details of principals; to the extent possible, reason for inclusion on the list; and geographic information, such as the location, date and time of the transaction.
• Providing prompt feedback to financial institutions on reports made following circulation of such official lists.
• The provision of meaningful information in relation to patterns, techniques and mechanisms used in the financing of terrorism to assist with monitoring procedures.
• The provision of meaningful information about corporate and other types of vehicles used to facilitate terrorist financing.
• The development of guidelines on appropriate levels of heightened scrutiny in relation to sectors or activities identified by competent authorities as being widely used for terrorist financing.
• The development by governments and clearing agencies of uniform global formats for funds transfers that require information which may assist their efforts to prevent and detect the financing of terrorism.
• Ensuring that national legislation:
  • Permits financial institutions to maintain information derived from official lists within their own databases and to share such information within their own groups.
  • Affords financial institutions protection from civil liability for relying on such lists.
  • Permits financial institutions to report unusual or suspicious transactions that may relate to terrorism to the relevant authorities without breaching any duty of customer confidentiality or privacy legislation.
  • Permits the prompt exchange of information between governmental agencies of different nation states.

The Wolfsberg Group supports the FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing as measures conducive to the suppression of the financing of terrorism.

16.1.5 ECOFIN meeting on 16 October 2001

Money laundering – results of the Conciliation Committee meeting
The Council took note of the progress of the Presidency’s negotiations with the European Parliament rapporteur under the conciliation procedure concerning the amendment of the 1991 Directive on money laundering. That result raised hopes that the new text of the overall compromise accepted by the Permanent Representatives Committee at its meeting on 10 October 2001 could be accepted by the European Parliament delegation at its meeting on 17 October 2001 and should allow formal adoption of the Directive which aims at broadening the scope of the 1991 Directive and extending the obligations in it to certain non-financial activities and professions, particularly the legal and accounting professions.

Ministers welcomed this result, underlining the importance of this Directive in combating the financing of terrorism, and expressed their determination to see it transposed into national law at the earliest opportunity.

16.1.6 Council of the EU Framework Decision on combatting terrorism

Article 1 Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of:
- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation,
shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:
(a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).
2. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.

Article 2 Offences relating to a terrorist group
1. For the purposes of this Framework Decision, "terrorist group" shall mean: a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. "Structured group" shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional acts are punishable:
(a) directing a terrorist group;
(b) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.

Article 3 Offences linked to terrorist activities
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences include the following acts:
(a) aggravated theft with a view to committing one of the acts listed in Article 1(1);
(b) extortion with a view to the perpetration of one of the acts listed in Article 1(1);
(c) drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing one of the acts listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h) and Article 2(2)(b).

Article 4 Inciting, aiding or abetting, and attempting
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding or abetting an offence referred to in Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to commit an offence referred to in Article 1(1) and Article 3, with the exception of possession as provided for in Article 1(1)(f) and the offence referred to in Article 1(1)(i), is made punishable.

Article 5 Penalties
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist offences referred to in Article 1(1) and offences referred to in Article 4, inasmuch as they relate to terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those imposable under national law for such offences in the absence of the special intent required pursuant to Article 1(1), save where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under national law.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences listed in Article 2 are punishable by custodial sentences, with a maximum sentence of not less than fifteen years for the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(a), and for the offences listed in Article 2(2)(b) a maximum sentence of not less than eight years. In so far as the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(a) refers only to the act in Article 1(1)(i), the maximum sentence shall not be less than eight years.

Article 6 Particular circumstances
Each Member State may take the necessary measures to ensure that the penalties referred to in Article 5 may be reduced if the offender:
(a) renounces terrorist activity, and
(b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to:
(i) prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
(ii) identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
(iii) find evidence; or
(iv) prevent further offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4.

**Article 7 Liability of legal persons**
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for any of the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on one of the following:
   (a) a power of representation of the legal person;
   (b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person;
   (c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. Apart from the cases provided for in paragraph 1, each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of any of the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 for the benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.
3. Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators or accessories in any of the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4.

**Article 8 Penalties for legal persons**
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 7 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other penalties, such as:
(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
(b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities;
(c) placing under judicial supervision;
(d) a judicial winding-up order;
(e) temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for committing the offence.

**Article 9 Jurisdiction and prosecution**
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 where:
   (a) the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory. Each Member State may extend its jurisdiction if the offence is committed in the territory of a Member State;
   (b) the offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft registered there;
   (c) the offender is one of its nationals or residents;
   (d) the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in its territory;
   (e) the offence is committed against the institutions or people of the Member State in question or against an institution of the European Union or a body set up in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community or the Treaty on European Union and based in that Member State.
2. When an offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State and when any of the States concerned can validly prosecute on the basis of the same facts, the Member States concerned shall cooperate in order to decide which of them will prosecute the offenders with the aim, if possible, of centralising proceedings in a single Member State. To this end, the Member States may have recourse to any body or mechanism established within the European Union in order to facilitate cooperation between their judicial authorities and the coordination of their action. Sequential account shall be taken of the following factors:
   - the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the acts were committed,
   - the Member State shall be that of which the perpetrator is a national or resident,
   - the Member State shall be the Member State of origin of the victims,
   - the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the perpetrator was found.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures also to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 in cases where it refuses to hand over or extradite a person suspected or convicted of such an offence to another Member State or to a third country.
4. Each Member State shall ensure that its jurisdiction covers cases in which any of the offences referred to in Articles 2 and 4 has been committed in whole or in part within its territory, wherever the terrorist group is based or pursues its criminal activities.
5. This Article shall not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters as laid down by a Member State in accordance with its national legislation.